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VICTIMS UNDER ATTACK: NORTH CAROLINA’S 
FLAWED RULE 609* 
DANIEL R. TILLY** 
Evidence law in North Carolina senselessly punishes victims of 
domestic and sexual violence by broadly sanctioning witness 
impeachment with prior convictions––no matter the implicit 
prejudice to the witness or how little the conviction bears on 
credibility. The North Carolina approach is an outlier. Under Rule 
609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the use of conviction evidence 
for impeaching witness credibility is confined to felonies and crimes 
involving dishonest acts or false statements. Their use must also 
satisfy judicial balancing tests aimed at protecting against unfair 
prejudice to the witness. The majority of states take a similar or even 
more restrictive approach. North Carolina’s corresponding rule, 
however, casts a far wider net. It broadly permits parties to impeach 
witnesses with an array of convictions, including innocuous 
misdemeanors, and affords no judicial discretion to protect the 
witness or weigh the potential for juror misuse. The implications are 
unavoidable. For survivors of domestic and sexual violence, the 
state’s approach to conviction-based impeachment can be especially 
devastating. 
This Article explores one of the most controversial rules of 
evidence––impeaching a witness with her prior convictions––
through the lens of North Carolina’s broad impeachment rule. The 
impact of the rule can no longer be ignored, and this Article argues 
that change is long overdue. This Article discusses the genesis of 
conviction-based impeachment and its modern usage. It spotlights 
how the North Carolina rule enables trial lawyers to levy a barrage 
of questions at a witness to suggest overtly that the witness is a liar 
while covertly implying the witness is a person of untoward 
character. By exposing the rule’s impact on victims, particularly 
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sexual assault and domestic violence survivors, the Article reveals 
how impeachment by prior-conviction evidence in North Carolina is 
used as a pretext for improperly assailing a witness’s character. The 
Article concludes by proposing statutory reforms to limit prior-
conviction evidence to its proper purpose while halting the abuses 
currently sanctioned by the rule. 
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INTRODUCTION 
American jurisprudence is founded on the adversarial system.1 Civil 
and criminal trials are waged throughout the nation as a contest between 
 
 1. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 846 (1990) (noting “rigorous adversarial testing” 
is the “norm of Anglo-American criminal proceedings”); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 516 
(1947) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“[A] common law trial is and always should be an adversary 
proceeding.”); Stephan A. Landsman, A Brief Survey of the Development of the Adversary 
System, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 713, 716 (1983) (chronicling the history of the adversarial system and 
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two opposing sides.2 Within this arena, people are haled forth into the 
contest as witnesses.3 Their testimony is public, under oath, and exposed to 
the piercing gaze of the fact-finder.4 They offer their accounts under the 
direction of the party who called them to testify. And then cross-
examination begins. Witnesses are probed; their biases, relationships, 
education, perception, demeanor, motives, and more are openly 
scrutinized.5 The most controversial tactic within the cross-examination 
arsenal involves subjecting a witness to questions about her6 past criminal 
convictions to imply that now, although removed in time from her former 
misdeeds, she must be lying on the stand.7 
Evidentiary rules permitting witness credibility to be impeached with 
prior-conviction evidence are easily the most criticized within the 
adversarial system, with scholars and commentators urging reform for 
 
describing the modern adversarial trial process as “highly competitive” and “tend[ing] to promote 
a win-at-any-cost attitude”). 
 2. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 (1984) (describing the trial process 
envisioned by the Sixth Amendment as a “confrontation between adversaries”). Unquestionably, 
significant strides are being made in alternative, non-adversarial-based dispute resolution and 
restorative justice programs in the civil and criminal system. See Hadgar Dancig-Rosenberg & 
Tali Gal, Restorative Criminal Justice, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2313, 2321 (2013) (noting that “the 
restorative process is not adversarial” because offenders must take responsibility for their 
offenses before engaging with victims to address the harm caused); Timothy R. Rice, Restoring 
Justice: Purging Evil From Federal Rule of Evidence 609, 89 TEMP. L. REV. 683, 696–700 
(2017) (observing the impact of restorative justice and reentry programs on the traditional 
adversarial process and how impeachment by prior conviction undermines these efforts). At its 
core, however, the American justice system is adversarial, particularly in the criminal justice 
system. See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 641 (1991) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (“Trials in this country are adversarial proceedings.”); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 
539, 563 (1974) (“[A]dversary proceedings [are] typical of the criminal trial . . . .”). 
 3. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 187 (1997) (illustrating a trial as a “colorful 
story with descriptive richness,” the narratives of which are told through witnesses).  
 4. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157–58 (1970) (detailing the importance of the oath, 
cross-examination, and demeanor evidence to the truth-finding process for the fact finder). 
 5. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) (describing the adversarial 
method of testing witness testimony as the “crucible of cross-examination”); Davis v. Alaska, 415 
U.S. 308, 316 (1974) (noting that a less general and more specific “attack on the witness’ 
credibility is effected by means of cross-examination directed toward revealing possible biases, 
prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness”). 
 6. The feminine pronoun is used throughout because this Article focuses on the impact that 
conviction-based impeachment has on victims of sexual and domestic violence. These victims are 
overwhelmingly female, see Statistics, NAT’L COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 
https://ncadv.org/statistics [https://perma.cc/S229-PH8L]. 
 7. Montré D. Carodine, “The Mis-Characterization of the Negro”: A Race Critique of the 
Prior Conviction Impeachment Rule, 84 IND. L.J. 521, 524 (2009) (noting that the federal rule 
admitting prior-conviction evidence to impeach a witness “is one of the most controversial, if not 
the most controversial of all of the rules of evidence”); Ric Simmons, An Empirical Study of Rule 
609 and Suggestions for Practical Reform, 59 B.C. L. REV. 993, 995 (2018) (observing that the 
federal rule permitting impeachment by prior conviction “is perhaps the most maligned of any 
Federal Rule of Evidence”). 
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decades.8 The vast majority of this criticism has focused on Rule 609 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence9 and its detrimental impact on the criminally 
accused.10 Less criticism has been directed at state rules permitting witness 
impeachment with prior convictions, despite the fact that most trials occur 
at the state, not federal, level.11 Even fewer critiques focus on the impact on 
victim-witnesses who are subjected to impeachment with their prior 
convictions.12 This Article seeks to fill that gap by focusing specifically on 
 
 8. As Ric Simmons observes, the critiques are “too numerous to list” in a single footnote. 
Simmons, supra note 7, at 995 n.1. Scholarly critiques have been varied. See, e.g., Jeffrey Bellin, 
The Silence Penalty, 103 IOWA L. REV. 395, 415–24 (2018) [hereinafter Bellin, Silence Penalty] 
(demonstrating through empirical data the detrimental impact of impeachment with prior-
conviction evidence on the accused and the silencing effect such rules have on defendants); 
Jeffrey Bellin, Circumventing Congress: How the Federal Courts Opened the Door to 
Impeaching Criminal Defendants With Prior Convictions, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 289, 289–90 
(2008) [hereinafter Bellin, Circumventing Congress] (arguing for judicial reform to the balancing 
factors courts utilize when considering impeachment by conviction evidence under Rule 609); 
John H. Blume, The Dilemma of the Criminal Defendant with a Prior Record—Lessons from the 
Wrongfully Convicted, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 477, 477 (2008) (arguing for strict 
limitations on impeaching accused persons with conviction evidence based on empirical evidence 
showing the silencing effect on innocent defendants); Carodine, supra note 7, at 521 (critiquing 
racial bias within the criminal justice system and the perpetually unreliable convictions that result 
from employing impeachment by prior conviction); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Prior Crime 
Impeachment of Criminal Defendants: A Constitutional Analysis of Rule 609, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 
391, 409–21 (1980) (arguing Rule 609 violates due process and fair trial constitutional guarantees 
when applied to the accused); Rice supra note 2, at 683–89 (criticizing Rule 609(a) as punitive, 
stigmatizing, and counter to modern restorative justice approaches to criminal justice); Anna 
Roberts, Conviction by Prior Impeachment, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1977, 1992–2001, 2018–36 (2016) 
[hereinafter Roberts, Impeachment] (analyzing the flaws perpetuating impeachment by conviction 
evidence and arguing for reform based on progressive state approaches); Anna Roberts, 
Impeachment by Unreliable Conviction, 55 B.C. L. REV. 563, 563–66 (2014) [hereinafter 
Roberts, Unreliable Conviction] (arguing prior convictions must be scrutinized for reliable 
culpability before consideration as viable impeachment evidence); Anna Roberts, Reclaiming the 
Importance of the Defendant’s Testimony: Prior Conviction Impeachment and the Fight Against 
Implicit Stereotyping, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 835, 835 (2016) [hereinafter Roberts, Implicit 
Stereotyping] (arguing implicit bias and juror stereotyping is perpetuated by judicial standards 
tending to admit prior convictions for impeaching testifying defendants which tends to silence 
critical testimony from the accused);. 
 9. FED. R. EVID. 609. 
 10. See, e.g., Blume, supra note 8, at 477–80; Carodine, supra note 7, at 521; James H. 
Gold, Sanitizing Prior Impeachment Evidence to Reduce Its Prejudicial Effects, 27 ARIZ. L. REV. 
691, 691–93 (1985); Nichol, supra note 8, at 391–95; Rice, supra note 2, at 683–89; Roberts, 
Impeachment, supra note 8, at 1977–82; Roberts, Implicit Stereotyping, supra note 8, at 836–40; 
Roberts, Unreliable Conviction, supra note 8, at 563–66. 
 11. See, e.g., Dannye R. Holley, Judicial Anarchy: The Admission of Convictions to 
Impeach: State Supreme Courts’ Interpretative Standards, 1990-2004, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
307, 311–15; Ted Sampsell-Jones, Minnesota’s Distortion of Rule 609, 31 HAMLINE L. REV. 405, 
425 (2008); Jeff Welty, Overcriminalization in North Carolina, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1935, 1937 
(2014) (“[T]he vast majority of criminal prosecutions in the United States happen in state 
courts.”). 
 12. Several factors may contribute to the lack of victim focus in this area. First, courts may 
be more lenient in excluding victims’ prior convictions when applying balancing tests that gauge 
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how this impeachment issue is addressed in North Carolina, a state whose 
evidentiary rules sanctioning witness impeachment with prior criminal 
convictions rank among the harshest in the nation to victim-witnesses—
vastly exceeding federal standards and the overwhelming number of sister 
states.13 As this Article demonstrates, the critiques aimed at narrower 
impeachment standards are amplified when applied to North Carolina’s 
regressive rule that, among its other effects, chills testimony14 and tends to 
promote wrongful convictions,15 racial bias,16 explicit and implicit 
stereotyping,17 and victim blaming.18 
In theory, prior-conviction evidence is admissible for the single, 
limited purpose of questioning whether the testifying witness may now be 
lying given that she was previously convicted of a crime.19 The evidence is 
said to be inadmissible for the more obvious suggestion that the witness has 
a general character bent on criminality, particularly when the witness is the 
 
the viability of the evidence as indicators of untruthfulness against the harm and prejudice that 
may come from admitting victim convictions. Second, because the prosecution cannot appeal 
acquittals, fewer records of judicial decisions concerning victim prior convictions may be 
available. Third, the likelihood of juror misuse and the life and liberty interest impacting the 
accused has tended to focus attention more on criminal defendants than victims or lay witnesses. 
 13. See N.C. R. EVID. 609; infra Part II. 
 14. State v. Lamb, 321 N.C. 633, 648, 365 S.E.2d 600, 608 (1988) (recognizing the 
“chilling” impact of prior criminal activity on a defendant’s decision to testify); State v. Perkins, 
235 N.C. App. 425, 763 S.E.2d 928, 2014 WL 3824261, at *3 (2014) (unpublished table decision) 
(holding the defendant failed to preserve for appeal his claim that the trial court’s ruling allowing 
conviction impeachment evidence chilled his decision to testify because the defendant did not 
testify); see also Bellin, Silence Penalty, supra note 8, at 430; infra Section III.C. 
 15. State v. Cotton, 99 N.C. App. 615, 618–19, 394 S.E.2d 456, 458 (1990); Bellin, Silence 
Penalty, supra note 8, at 398–99 (detailing the story of Ronald Cotton, a North Carolina man 
famed for being exonerated by DNA evidence, who was impeached with his prior convictions 
when he testified to his innocence and observing that “[o]nce a jury learns of a defendant’s 
record, it is more likely to convict”); see also Blume, supra note 8, at 477–80. See generally 
Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand on Taking the Stand: The Effect of a 
Prior Criminal Record on the Decision to Testify and on Trial Outcomes, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 
1353 (2009) (utilizing empirical evidence to reveal the impact of prior-conviction evidence on a 
jury’s decision to convict in close cases, where the concern for erroneous convictions is greatest).  
 16. Carodine, supra note 7, at 521. 
 17. Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 15, at 1387 (discussing the “negative halo effect” of a 
prior conviction causing jurors to be unsympathetic toward the defendant); Roberts, Implicit 
Stereotyping, supra note 8, at 836–40. 
 18. See infra Section III.A. 
 19. This presumption has long been criticized as inaccurate and based on a faulty premise. 
See generally Todd A. Berger, Politics, Psychology, and the Law: Why Modern Psychology 
Dictates an Overhaul of Federal Rule of Evidence 609, 13 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 203 
(2009) (chronicling and debunking the psychological assumptions on predictive human behavior 
on which impeachment by prior criminal conviction is based). Recent empirical findings also 
reveal that jurors do not view prior criminal records as affecting defendant credibility. Eisenberg 
& Hans, supra note 15, at 1353. 
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defendant.20 Limiting instructions given by presiding judges to jurors 
attempt to confine prior-conviction evidence to its narrow, admissible 
impeachment purpose.21 The rule wishfully assumes jurors will 
intellectually compartmentalize the evidence to mere witness credibility 
and not a propensity to engage in deviant behavior.22 
Despite such doctrinal platitudes, jurors invariably use prior 
convictions as evidence of a defendant-witness’s guilt and may deem 
victim-witnesses not just untrustworthy, but as lesser human beings 
unworthy of protection.23 The deleterious consequences reverberating from 
impeachment by prior conviction are inescapable. Jurors are strongly 
inclined to punish the witnesses for their prior crimes, leading some 
witnesses to forgo testifying entirely.24 The rule also effectively promotes 
negative stereotypes among jurors about victims of sexual assault and 
domestic violence while enabling the revictimization of victim-witnesses 
who brave testifying.25 
North Carolina’s rule allowing broad, conviction-based impeachment 
differs little from the century-old assumption that once a criminal, always a 
liar.26 In North Carolina, any witness may be impeached with prior 
 
 20. State v. Ross, 329 N.C. 108, 119, 405 S.E.2d 158, 165 (1991) (“[I]t is important to 
remember that the only legitimate purpose for introducing evidence of past convictions is to 
impeach the witness’s credibility.”); State v. Wilkerson, 148 N.C. App. 310, 320–21, 559 S.E.2d 
5, 12 (2002) (Wynn, J., dissenting), rev’d per curiam, 356 N.C. 418, 571 S.E.2d 583 (2002) 
(relying on Judge Wynn’s dissent to reverse the lower court). 
 21. See, e.g., United States v. Redditt, 381 F.3d 597, 601 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that the trial 
court instructed the jury to limit the use of the defendant’s prior criminal convictions to the issue 
of credibility only and concluding, generally, that evidentiary errors from the admission of prior-
conviction evidence are considered “harmless if the court provides a curative instruction”). 
 22. United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“The jury is told to 
consider the defendant’s prior conviction only on the issue of credibility and not on the overall 
issue of guilt. But limiting instructions of this type require the jury to perform ‘a mental 
gymnastic which is beyond, not only their powers, but anybody’s else [sic].’” (quoting Nash v. 
United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932) (Hand, J.))); Roberts, Impeachment, supra note 
8, at 1998 (observing that no empirical evidence supports the concept that jurors are able to 
“partition their brains” to limit the use of prior-conviction evidence); Simmons, supra note 7, at 
1014 (“[T]hese instructions have a limited effect.”). 
 23. See Irving Younger, Three Essays on Character and Credibility Under the Federal Rules 
of Evidence, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 7, 10 (1976) (noting that “[d]octrinal purity then becomes 
doctrinal corruption” when one recognizes how, theoretically, prior convictions are conceived for 
use in evaluating witness credibility yet, practically, are used by jurors for the prohibited purpose 
of evincing the witness’s character for criminality). Recent empirical evidence supports this 
conclusion. See Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 15, at 1387–89; see also infra Section III.A. 
 24. See, e.g., Bellin, Silence Penalty, supra note 8, at 400; Blume, supra note 8, at 479 
(finding that the primary reason exonerated innocent defendants did not testify was “the fear of 
impeachment with their prior convictions.”); see also infra Section III.C. 
 25. See infra Sections III.A–III.B. 
 26. At common law, a witness testifying in North Carolina state courts would be subject to 
impeachment with any and all prior convictions, no matter the type of infraction or how remote in 
time. Ingle v. Roy Stone Transfer Corp., 271 N.C. 276, 279–81, 156 S.E.2d 265, 268–69 (1967); 
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convictions ranging from the most violent felonies to common 
misdemeanors.27 Unlike the federal rule, which carves out standards for 
courts to exclude certain criminal convictions of witnesses,28 including 
victims, the text of North Carolina Rule of Evidence 609(a) offers no 
judicial oversight.29 Moreover, the North Carolina rule fails to distinguish 
between convictions for felonies, crimes involving dishonesty, and those 
bearing little or no relationship to veracity whatsoever.30 A witness can be 
impeached as a liar for misdemeanor convictions involving injury to 
personal property or the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle just as 
vigorously as she can be impeached by felony convictions for 
embezzlement or perjury.31 
Further exacerbating the negative impact of North Carolina Rule 609, 
the state’s highest court has declared itself powerless to exclude prior-
conviction evidence no matter how extreme the prejudice.32 The Supreme 
Court of North Carolina rejected any suggestion that a trial court has 
 
State v. Griffin, 201 N.C. 541, 542–43, 160 S.E. 826, 827 (1931). Today’s rule remains largely 
the same in both form and application. Most convictions within ten years prior to the witness 
testifying are available to impeach the witness’s credibility. N.C. R. EVID. 609(b). More remote 
convictions are subjected to a strict balancing test. Id. However, in application, trial and appellate 
courts have readily allowed stale convictions, thus making the effect of the rule little different 
than its common law antecedent. See, e.g., State v. Ross, 329 N.C. 108, 116–19, 405 S.E.2d 158, 
163–65 (1991) (finding harmless error in the trial court’s decision to admit a nineteen-year-old 
conviction for sodomy); State v. Joyner, 243 N.C. App. 644, 650, 777 S.E.2d 332, 337 (2015) 
(finding no error in the trial court’s decision to admit five prior convictions, the most recent of 
which was fourteen years prior, despite the trial court’s findings when weighing Rule 609(b) 
factors). 
 27. See N.C. R. EVID. 609(a); see also infra Part II. 
 28. FED. R. EVID. 609. 
 29. N.C. R. EVID. 609(a). As currently enacted, North Carolina Rule of Evidence 609(a) 
states: 
(a) General rule.—For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that 
the witness has been convicted of a felony, or of a Class A1, Class 1, or Class 2 
misdemeanor, shall be admitted if elicited from the witness or established by public 
record during cross-examination or thereafter. 
Id. 
 30. Id. The Federal Rule of Evidence limits prior-conviction evidence to felonies and crimes 
wherein the elements require proof of “a dishonest act or false statement.” FED. R. EVID. 609(a). 
See also 1 KENNETH S. BROUN, RICHARD E. MYERS & JONATHAN E. BROUN, BRANDIS & 
BROUN ON NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 98 (8th ed. 2018) (“Like pre-Rule case law, [North 
Carolina Rule 609] does not require that the crime have a rational relevance to untruthfulness 
. . . .”). 
 31. See N.C. R. EVID. 609(a); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-72.2 (2017) (categorizing 
unauthorized use of a motor vehicle as punishable as a Class 1 misdemeanor); id. § 14-160 
(categorizing willful and wanton injury to personal property as punishable as a Class 2 
misdemeanor if damage is less than $200 and punishable as a Class 1 misdemeanor if damage 
exceeds $200). 
 32. State v. Brown, 357 N.C. 382, 389, 584 S.E.2d 278, 283 (2003). 
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discretion to exclude prior-conviction evidence when offered for 
impeachment, describing the language of Rule 609 as “mandatory.”33 And a 
recent decision from the North Carolina Court of Appeals appears to 
preclude any argument that the rule’s imposition “chills” testimony.34 
While some states have abolished or greatly curtailed impeachment by 
prior conviction, or at least provide judicial discretion to protect witnesses, 
North Carolina has steadfastly maintained a hard line.35 Even as the federal 
rule has been amended over the years to protect victims and other witnesses 
against unfair prejudice,36 North Carolina’s rule has not.37 
As this Article exposes, the regressive nature of North Carolina’s rule 
deters and demeans victims of domestic and sexual violence who have 
committed even modest criminal misdeeds. As currently codified and 
interpreted in North Carolina, impeachment with conviction evidence is 
broadly permissive—it need not bear any relationship to untruthfulness, 
cannot be excluded by the trial court no matter the detrimental impact on 
the victim, exposes the jury to the facts and types of convictions while 
hoping the jury will limit its use, and widely affords trial counsel the 
opportunity to inject trait-based character presumptions into the trial. This 
Article reveals how such a boundless evidentiary rule paves an 
unobstructed road for defense counsel to attack a victim’s personal 
character as one of questionable repute when she takes the witness stand. 
By exposing the rule’s impact on victim-witnesses, this Article 
demonstrates how impeachment with prior-conviction evidence may be 
used as a pretext for improperly assailing a witness’s character. 
This Article calls for reforming North Carolina Rule of Evidence 609 
to halt the abuses that it currently endorses which senselessly punish 
survivors. Part I examines the history of impeaching witness credibility 
with prior-conviction evidence, as well as the underlying premises 
supporting the practice. Part II contrasts North Carolina’s broad approach 
with those of other jurisdictions and then critically examines its breadth and 
application. Part III explores the impact of prior-conviction impeachment 
on survivors of sexual and domestic violence to reveal the systemic flaws 
 
 33. Id. (“The language of Rule 609(a) (‘shall be admitted’) is mandatory, leaving no room 
for the trial court’s discretion.” (emphasis added)). 
 34. State v. Perkins, 235 N.C. App. 425, 763 S.E.2d 928, 2014 WL 3824261, at *3 (2014) 
(unpublished table decision). 
 35. N.C. R. EVID. 609; Roberts, Impeachment, supra note 8, at 2018–32 (highlighting 
Kansas, Hawaii, and Montana as states that have restricted or abolished prior-conviction evidence 
to protect against misuse and abuse). 
 36. See infra notes 119–25 and accompanying text. 
 37. Brown, 357 N.C. at 390, 584 S.E.2d at 283 (“[T]he official comments to Rule 609(a) 
reveal an unequivocal intention to diverge from the federal requirement of a balancing test.” 
(emphasis added) (citing N.C. R. EVID. 609 cmt.)). 
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in North Carolina’s rigid rule. Part IV then proposes a revised Rule 609 
aimed at curtailing the abuse and misuse of conviction evidence when 
offered solely for questioning witness credibility. 
I.  IMPEACHMENT BY PRIOR CONVICTION 
Modern rules condoning witness impeachment with prior-conviction 
evidence trace back several centuries to the wholesale exclusion of 
witnesses who had been previously convicted of “infamous” crimes.38 Over 
time, the categorical exclusion of witness testimony eventually gave way to 
practical evidentiary concerns and the need for substantive proof.39 As 
detailed below, the evolution from strict witness exclusion to broad witness 
impeachment has raised substantive concerns in today’s trial practice that 
bear on due process and fair trial principles. 
A. Origins of Conviction-Based Impeachment 
Impeaching witnesses with prior-conviction evidence is rooted in the 
ancient English common law tradition of disqualifying felons from 
testifying.40 Disqualification by prior conviction originated as a 
consequence of attainder for committing an offense punishable by death.41 
The capital offender lost all proprietary and personal rights, including any 
notion that such a depraved person could ever again be trusted as a credible 
witness.42 The severity of the crime deemed the guilty to be wholly without 
credit, his reputation permanently stained by the heinous nature of his 
 
 38. Stuart P. Green, Deceit and the Classification of Crimes: Federal Rule of Evidence 
609(A)(2) and the Origins of Crimen Falsi, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1087, 1105 (2000) 
(noting that the exclusion of convicted persons from testifying dates back to at least the 
seventeenth century). 
 39. FED. R. EVID. 601 advisory committee’s note. The categorical exclusion of witnesses 
with criminal convictions penalized innocent defendants who needed exculpatory witness 
testimony. 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE 
§ 601 app. 102, at 10–12 (Mark S. Brodin & Joseph M. McLaughlin eds., Matthew Bender 2d ed. 
2019). State and federal rules declaring witnesses with prior convictions incompetent were 
eventually abandoned by the mid-twentieth century as irrational and unsound. Id.; see also Rosen 
v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 471 (1918). 
 40. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *380–81. Under English common law, the 
capital offender lost all proprietary and personal rights by “forfeiture and corruption of blood” 
based on the nature of his crime, including the competency to testify as a witness in court. Id. at 
*381 (emphasis added). 
 41. Id. at *380. As a result of his heinous crime, “[t]he criminal was then called attaint, 
attinctus, stained, or blackened” by his offense. Id. 
 42. Id. at *380–81; 1 FRANCIS WHARTON, A COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 
§ 397, at 354–55 (Philadelphia, Kay & Brother 1877). In fact, for a period of time, individuals 
accused of capital crimes were prevented from offering testimony at all. 4 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *380. 
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offense.43 The theory held that a crime rendering a person “unworthy to 
live” also made him “unworthy of belief.”44 A convicted individual being 
dead in law, but not yet in fact, possessed neither rights nor reputation.45 
Categorical disqualification was therefore a mere extension of devoid 
status. 
By the seventeenth century, testimonial disqualification expanded to 
include individuals convicted of “infamous” crimes.46 Crimes of infamy 
included treason, felonies, and crimen falsi offenses––broadly categorized 
as crimes wherein an essential element involves lying or deceit, including 
perjury, subornation of perjury, forgery, cheating, and the like.47 As with 
attainder, the loss of testimonial integrity was concomitant with the 
conviction itself.48 
The theory supporting testimonial disqualification evolved along with 
its expansion. It shifted from one underpinned by the severity of capital 
punishment to a more generalized presumption about the convicted 
person’s untrustworthiness.49 Conviction of an infamous crime cast the 
guilty as mendacious by character.50 In doing so, the expanding definition 
of infamous crimes focused on the dishonest nature of the offense.51 
 
 43. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *380–81; 1 SIMON GREENLEAF, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 372, at 417 (Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 
1842) (“The basis of the rule seems to be, that the witness is morally too corrupt to be trusted to 
testify.”). 
 44. GREENLEAF, supra note 43, § 373, at 418 (“[I]t was very natural, that crimes, deemed of 
so grave a character as to render the offender unworthy to live, should be considered as rendering 
him unworthy of belief in a court of justice.”). 
 45. Id. 
 46. 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 519, at 725–26 
(Chadbourn rev. 1979) (noting the extension of testimonial disqualification to include crimes of 
“moral turpitude” by the 1600s). 
 47. GREENLEAF, supra note 43, § 373, at 418 (observing that “the extent and meaning of the 
term, crimen falsi, in our law, is nowhere laid down with precision,” but that term’s origins in 
Roman law support “every species of fraud and deceit”); RICHARD NEWCOMBE GRESLEY & 
CHRISTOPHER ALDERSON CALVERT, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN THE COURTS OF 
EQUITY 333 (2d ed. Philadelphia, T. & J. W. Johnson 1848); WHARTON, supra note 42, § 397, at 
354; 2 WIGMORE, supra note 46, § 520, at 729–30. 
 48. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 511 (1989) (noting that conviction-
based disqualification was part and parcel to the punishment itself). 
 49. 2 WIGMORE, supra note 46, § 519, at 726. 
 50. JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE (1827), as reprinted in 7 THE 
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 406 (John Bowring ed., Edinburgh, Simpkin, Marshal & Co. 
1843) (“In the case of mendacity it runs thus: He has violated the obligations of morality not only 
in other sorts of ways, but in this very sort of way, on former occasions; therefore it is more or 
less probable that so he will on the occasion now in hand.”). 
 51. WHARTON, supra note 42, § 397, at 355 n.1 (1877) (“It is the infamy of the crime, and 
not the nature . . . of the punishment, that destroys competency.”); 2 WIGMORE, supra note 46, at 
726 (noting the evolution of the theory supporting testimonial exclusion from punishment to a 
theory of morality where “the person is to be excluded because from such a moral nature it is 
useless to expect the truth”). 
97 N.C. L. REV. 1553 (2019) 
2019] VICTIMS UNDER ATTACK 1563 
Notably, disqualification for infamous crimes derived from an assumption 
of general character rather than any specific connection to the case, the 
parties, or other basis for incompetency.52 The witness was not disqualified 
because he was unworthy to live. Rather, a presumed “insensibility to the 
obligation of an oath” for the commission of the infamous crime meant the 
person was “morally too corrupt to be trusted to testify.”53 While the theory 
evolved, the effect was the same54: individuals guilty of infamous crimes 
were categorically excluded from testifying.55 No degree of judicial 
discretion was permitted; testimonial exclusion was absolute.56 
American common law perpetuated testimonial disqualification by 
adopting the theory that dishonest character was a by-product of an 
infamous-crime conviction.57 As late as the early twentieth century, the 
categorical exclusion of convicted persons from testifying in American 
courts operated as a hard, albeit clear, line;58 however, it was not without 
significant penalty to the system of justice that imposed the rule. Rigid 
witness-disqualification rules created deleterious consequences in both civil 
and criminal trials where innocent third parties suffered the primary impact 
through the loss of relevant evidence.59 As a consequence, the theory 
 
 52. GRESLEY & CALVERT, supra note 47, at 328–29. In fact, the common law recognized 
numerous testimonial disqualifications based upon classification of persons and interest in the 
outcome. Id. at 330–32. These included classes of persons deemed to “labour under a general 
incompetency,” including those deemed non compos mentis, young children, individuals “not 
influenced by any religious belief,” persons guilty of infamous crimes, and, in the courts of 
Scotland, women. Id. at 331–33. The second basis of incompetency derived from the witness’s 
connection to the case, including testimonial disqualification of parties and persons personally or 
financially interested in the outcome. Id. at 336–37. 
 53. GREENLEAF, supra note 43, § 372, at 417. This same mendacious character theory would 
perpetuate in American common law centuries later with jurists declaring previously convicted 
individuals of dubious moral character unworthy of belief. See Gertz v. Fitchburg R.R., 137 
Mass. 77, 78 (1884) (declaring that prior convictions demonstrate a “general readiness to do evil” 
which supports “the general proposition that he is of bad character and unworthy of credit”). 
 54. John Leroy Jeffers, Comment, Witnesses—Removal of Conviction of Felony as a 
Testimonial Disqualification in Texas, 10 TEX. L. REV. 87, 87 (1931) (“[T]he theory that such 
exclusion was an incident to the punishment of the crime being early superseded by the idea that 
the untrustworthy nature of the testimony was the basis for refusing its admission.”). 
 55. GRESLEY & CALVERT, supra note 47, at 333 (describing incompetency by infamy as a 
“bar to the admission of the evidence of the person marked with it”). 
 56. Id. 
 57. 2 WIGMORE, supra note 46, § 519, at 725 (concluding that disqualification by criminal 
conviction was fully established in American jurisprudence by the end of the 1600s); Jeffers, 
supra note 54, at 87. 
 58. Ralph R. Wood, Comment, Infamy as a Testimonial Disqualification, 2 TEX. L. REV. 
227, 228 (1924) (criticizing the categorical disqualification of witnesses convicted of infamous 
crimes as having “only one virtue, its certainty. It operates on just and unjust alike”). 
 59. 2 WIGMORE, supra note 46, § 519, at 726 (noting that “whatever degree the 
disqualification may have been thought of as part of the punishment of the offender himself, it 
was obvious that this theory could not of itself justify the incidental punishment of innocent 
persons who might need the convict’s testimony” (emphasis added)). The rule’s effects were 
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supporting conviction-based disqualification fell under severe criticism for 
being “illiberal” and “unnecessary.”60 Among the most strident 
condemnations came from English philosopher and legal scholar, Jeremy 
Bentham, who proclaimed: 
Exclusion knows no gradations: blind and brainless, it has but one 
alternative;—shut or open, like a valve, up or down . . . [b]ut a single 
transgression of this sort,—what does it prove? . . . [T]hat on one 
assignable occasion the convict has been known to fall into that sort 
of transgression, which every human adult must also have fallen into 
. . . .61 
Eventually, mounting scholarly criticism and the ongoing loss of 
probative evidence led England to abolish the rule by statute in 1843.62 
American jurisdictions followed suit in the decades thereafter.63 By the 
early twentieth century, most had converted rigid disqualification mandates 
into rules supporting witness testimony subject to impeachment.64 In Rosen 
v. United States,65 the Supreme Court summarized the then-prevailing trend 
jettisoning conviction-based testimonial disqualification in favor of prior 
crimes bearing on credibility: 
 
sometimes catastrophic. Percipient witnesses who could offer credible accounts of civil 
transactions or torts were per se excluded. In criminal trials, for example, jurors never heard 
testimony from witnesses prepared to offer contradictory accounts to those alleged by the 
prosecution or alibis supporting the accused. See generally Green, supra note 38, at 1105–06 
(describing how testimonial disqualification “penalize[d] innocent defendants”). A complex 
series of exceptions and conditions evolved within the common law to account for the loss of 
otherwise relevant, valuable evidence. See BENTHAM, supra note 50, at 401–06 (describing a 
variety of exceptions to the disqualification of parties from testifying, including necessity, facts 
which none but the party would know, and public necessity). 
 60. 2 WIGMORE, supra note 46, § 488, at 647. See also Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 
575 (1961) (“Broadside assaults upon the entire structure of disqualifications, particularly the 
disqualification of interest, were launched early in the nineteenth century in both England and 
America.”); Vance v. State, 68 S.W. 37, 42–43 (Ark. 1902) (chastising disqualification by prior 
conviction as having “no valid reason” that “not only suppress[es] evidence” but operates in such 
a way that “justice is often thwarted”). 
 61. BENTHAM, supra note 50, at 407. 
 62. An Act for Improving the Law of Evidence 1843, 6 & 7 Vict. c. 85 (Eng.) (“[T]he 
inquiry after Truth in Courts of Justice is often obstructed by [Incapacities by the present Law, 
and it is desirable that full Information as to the Facts in Issue, both in Criminal and Civil Cases, 
should be laid before the Persons who are appointed to decide upon them, and that such Persons 
should exercise their Judgment on the Credit of the Witnesses adduced and on the Truth of their 
Testimony . . . .”). 
 63. WHARTON, supra note 42, § 567, at 513. 
 64. 2 WIGMORE, supra note 46, § 488, at 647 n.1 (detailing statutory enactments in England 
and American states from the mid-nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century eschewing 
conviction-based witness-disqualification rules in favor of credibility-based impeachment of 
witnesses with prior convictions). 
 65. 245 U.S. 467 (1918). 
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[T]ruth is more likely to be arrived at by hearing the testimony of all 
persons of competent understanding who may seem to have 
knowledge of the facts involved in a case, leaving the credit and 
weight of such testimony to be determined by the jury or by the 
court, rather than by rejecting witnesses as incompetent.66 
The logic espoused in Rosen eventually won the day as rules disqualifying 
previously convicted witnesses from testifying fell in almost every 
American jurisdiction.67 Unfortunately, while these rule changes were a 
victory for parties who needed evidence that could be offered by persons 
with a criminally-stained past, the impact on those who would now testify 
would quickly be realized in full force.68 Today, victims and accused 
persons are permitted to testify, subject to being impeached with their 
criminal past. The consequence of permissive impeachment, though, is 
unavoidable—many choose to remain silent rather than suffer degrading 
character attacks.69 
B. Prior Crimes as Evidence of Mendacious Character 
The movement favoring impeachment over disqualification was 
considered one of progressive reform––particularly for criminal defendants 
previously foreclosed from testifying in their own defense.70 Progressive 
change did not, however, come without regressive impact. While the 
criminally convicted witness could now testify, his credibility was 
castigated by an open foray into his past crimes.71 In most states, crimes of 
any and every sort were available as impeachment fodder without 
qualification.72 Justice Holmes summarized the justification for broad 
 
 66. Id. at 471. 
 67. Rogers v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 325 F.2d 134, 137 (6th Cir. 1963). 
 68. See, e.g., Bellin, Silence Penalty, supra note 8, at 415–24; Blume, supra note 8, at 477; 
Carodine, supra note 7, at 521, 550–52; Roberts, Impeachment, supra note 8, at 1994–2014; 
Roberts, Implicit Stereotyping, supra note 8, at 835; Roberts, Unreliable Conviction, supra note 
8, at 563. 
 69. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 39, § 609 app. 100, at 18 (“Fear of public degradation 
may make the possessors of a criminal record reluctant to testify, or even to complain of criminal 
acts directed against them, to the detriment of the judicial system’s interest in obtaining useful 
testimony.”); Bellin, Silence Penalty, supra note 8, at 398–99. 
 70. Bellin, Circumventing Congress, supra note 8, at 297 (noting that witness impeachment 
with prior-conviction evidence “was a byproduct of a progressive reform that removed rather than 
added to the obstacles facing convicts (including, of course, many criminal defendants) who 
sought to testify”). 
 71. 3A WIGMORE, supra note 46, § 986, at 861 (“When in the 1800s the disqualification was 
abolished, the statute sanctioned the use of convictions for all kinds of crimes by way of 
impeachment.”). 
 72. WHARTON, supra note 42, § 567, at 513 (observing that once states revised rules 
formerly disqualifying criminals from testifying, they begin permitting the witness’s record of 
97 N.C. L. REV. 1553 (2019) 
1566 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97 
impeachment with any prior crime in an 1884 opinion penned for the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court.73 He postulated that when “a witness has 
been convicted of a crime,” the “ground for disbelieving him” is afforded 
by the conviction, which, according to Holmes, reveals in the witness a 
“general readiness to do evil.”74 Holmes claimed that it is from this 
“general disposition alone that the jury is asked to infer a readiness to lie in 
the particular case.”75 
The “infamous” crime theory supporting testimonial disqualification 
was thus recast into testimonial impeachment theory. American legislatures 
followed along, transposing the grounds for witness disqualification into 
grounds for impeaching witness credibility.76 In doing so, however, they 
universally failed to analyze the very premise on which Holmes based his 
theory.77 Most legislatures, like North Carolina’s then and today, blindly 
assumed a prior criminal offense begat dishonest testimony without 
considering the crime itself or its correlation to untruthfulness.78 
More than a century later, Justice Holmes’s hypothesis about 
mendacious character as a derivative of criminal conduct remains firmly 
entrenched in American law.79 Under the federal rules, and those in forty-
nine states, witness credibility may be challenged with prior-conviction 
 
conviction to “be put in[to] evidence in order to impeach credibility”); 3A WIGMORE, supra note 
46, § 986, at 861. 
 73. Gertz v. Fitchburg R.R., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. (emphasis added). 
 76. See Advisory Committee’s Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the 
United States District Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 297 (1969) (noting that 
impeachment-based statutes across the states “consist[] in substance of the common law grounds 
of disqualification transposed into grounds of impeachment”). 
 77. Mason Ladd, Credibility Tests—Current Trends, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 166, 175 (1940) 
(“[N]one [of the statutes abandoning disqualification in favor of impeachment by prior conviction 
were] drafted upon the basis of the specific relationship of the crime to the character of the 
witness for truthfulness.”). 
 78. Id.; see, e.g., Blakney v. United States, 397 F.2d 648, 649–50 (D.C. Cir. 1968) 
(McGowan, J. concurring) (noting of the D.C. statute adopting impeachment-based use of prior 
convictions that “[t]here is apparently no relevant legislative history, so we can only speculate as 
to why the attainder continued to some degree in the form of permissive employment of the past 
conviction to impeach credibility”); State v. Carter, 326 N.C. 243, 250, 388 S.E.2d 111, 116 
(1990) (concluding that, under North Carolina Rule 609(a), convictions for discrediting a witness 
are admissible without the crime having any “rational relevance to untruthfulness” (quoting 1 
HENRY BRANDIS, BRANDIS ON NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 112, at 484 (3d ed. 1988))). 
 79. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 555 F.2d 1273, 1276 (5th Cir. 1977) (“The rationale 
of the rule allowing impeachment by the use of former convictions is that unbelievability may be 
inferred from defendant’s general readiness to do evil . . . [and that] [p]rior convictions may 
indicate the accused has a criminal nature and . . . propensity to falsify his testimony.” (emphasis 
added)); People v. Castro, 696 P.2d 111, 118–19 (Cal. 1984) (in bank) (repeating the Holmes 
rationale from Gertz and concluding that “[t]he [p]eople point to no other rational justification for 
felony impeachment”). 
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evidence.80 Although the types of convictions permitted to impeach 
witnesses vary, the theory remains the same. Ostensibly, a person who has 
been previously convicted of a crime is less apt to offer a truthful account 
of the facts when testifying at a subsequent trial.81 When conviction-based 
impeachment is untethered from crimes correlating to dishonesty, the 
theory is sustained on this bare assumption alone.82 That Justice Holmes’s 
hypothesis is psychologically viable is unfounded.83 Many crimes have no 
bearing on a person’s veracity whatsoever.84 Studies suggest that their 
predictive value for future untruthfulness is fundamentally flawed.85 
Unsurprisingly, the multilayered assumptions justifying the conclusion that 
convictions translate to false testimony have been repeatedly derided as 
“junk science at its worst.”86 The distinct likelihood that the jury will use 
prior-conviction evidence to punish the witness, however, is inescapable.87 
 
 80. Roberts, Impeachment, supra note 8, at 2027 (highlighting Montana as the lone state 
prohibiting conviction-based impeachment of all witnesses). 
 81. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974) (concluding that the jury is permitted to infer 
that a witness who has a prior criminal conviction is “less likely than the average trustworthy 
citizen to be truthful in his testimony”). 
 82. Roderick Surratt, Prior-Conviction Impeachment Under the Federal Rules of Evidence: 
A Suggested Approach to Applying the “Balancing” Provision of Rule 609(a), 31 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 907, 910 (1980) (“The rationale for prior-conviction impeachment is that a person who has 
committed a crime may have less of a general propensity for ‘truthfulness’ than a person without 
a criminal ‘record.’”). 
 83. Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 707 (7th Cir. 1987) (“The proposition that felons 
perjure themselves more often than other, similarly situated witnesses (e.g., a criminal defendant 
who has not been convicted of a felony or a prisoner in a civil rights suit whose only prior 
conviction is a misdemeanor) is one of many important empirical assertions about law that have 
never been tested, and may be false. It is undermined, though not disproved, by psychological 
studies which show that moral conduct in one situation is not highly correlated with moral 
conduct in another.”); Rice, supra note 2, at 691 (noting that research demonstrates that moral 
conduct is situationally dependent). The rule’s validity remains dependent on trait-based 
assumptions of human character rooted in Justice Holmes’s unsubstantiated theory. See supra 
note 53 and accompanying text. It is easy to see how the theory fails on innumerable fronts. If the 
prior crime bears no rational correlation to untruthful acts, the theory is corrupt at the outset. Even 
where the crime does involve an element of deceit, a single instance of misconduct is unlikely to 
reveal a person’s generalized character for future perjury. See Dannye W. Holley, Federalism 
Gone Far Astray from Policy and Constitutional Concerns: The Administration of Convictions to 
Impeach by State’s Rules—1990–2004, 2 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 239, 303–05 (2005) (“A record of 
conviction of a crime is a provable fact, but there is no evidence that it has the probability of 
proving that the person whose credibility is attacked has a greater propensity to lie.” (emphasis 
added)); Ladd, supra note 77, at 177–78. 
 84. Ladd, supra note 77, at 178. 
 85. Berger, supra note 19, at 207–14 (debunking trait-based assumptions that prior crimes 
are predictive of future untruthfulness through psychological studies to conclude that “[b]ecause 
Rule 609 overestimates the importance of general character traits, and underestimates the 
importance of the situation and context, the psychological assumptions upon which Rule 609 is 
based reflect at its very core the Fundamental Attribution Error”). 
 86. Roberts, Impeachment, supra note 8, at 1992 (“The historical heuristic, which is the 
longest historical proffered ‘proof’ of this reality hypothesis––that disobedience to the law is 
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C. Reining in Conviction-Based Impeachment 
In the early part of the twentieth century, broad use of convictions for 
challenging witness credibility began falling out of favor. The theory that 
prior criminal acts suggested a general character for mendacity appeared 
unsound, particularly when applied to crimes not involving an element of 
dishonesty.88 In turn, the English legal system that first gave life to 
impeachment by prior conviction became the first to abandon its use.89 
American jurisdictions retained conviction-based impeachment but began 
narrowing the available offenses. Revised rules focused on crimes that 
more closely related to untruthfulness, including crimes of moral turpitude 
or those involving crimen falsi.90 Similarly, courts began departing from the 
stringent approach to impeachment by excluding convictions based on 
unfair prejudice considerations.91 
These piecemeal statutory and judicial revisions soon gave way to 
comprehensive efforts to reform American evidence law, including 
impeachment practices. In 1941, the American Law Institute’s Model Code 
of Evidence proposed limiting impeachment with prior-conviction evidence 
to offenses involving dishonesty or false statement only.92 The Model 
Code’s approach was not absolute in permitting impeachment with these 
limited offenses, either; Rule 303 proposed empowering judges with 
discretion to exclude any conviction that raised a substantial danger of 
 
logical evidence of a greater propensity to lie––is ‘junk science’ at its worst.” (quoting Holley, 
supra note 83, at 304–05)). 
 87. Erwin N. Griswold, The Long View, 51 A.B.A. J. 1017, 1021 (1965) (“Is there anyone 
who doubts what the effect of [prior-conviction] evidence . . . is on the jury?”). See generally 
Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 15, at 1388 (demonstrating through research and studies that jurors 
do not use prior-conviction evidence to evaluate credibility but to punish the witness, making the 
historical justifications for conviction-based impeachment “unfounded”). 
 88. Innocuous malum prohibitum misdemeanors are clearly distinguishable from malum in 
se felonies. See Ladd, supra note 77, at 181 & n.54. 
 89. Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Vict. c. 36, § 1(f) (Eng.) (prohibiting the use of 
prior-conviction evidence to impeach a testifying defendant); see also Robert D. Dodson, What 
Went Wrong with Federal Rule of Evidence 609: A Look at How Jurors Really Misuse Prior 
Conviction Evidence, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 28–29 (1999) (noting several exceptions recognized 
by English courts, including when the defendant placed his character “in issue” and when prior 
convictions were used to demonstrate similar acts or motive as those in the crime accused). 
 90. Julia Simon-Kerr, Credibility by Proxy, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 152, 172 (2017) 
[hereinafter Simon-Kerr, Credibility by Proxy] (“By the late nineteenth century, courts in states 
including Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Texas, California, Connecticut, Louisiana, Maine, New 
York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Vermont, Wyoming, and Maine were using moral turpitude 
as an impeachment standard.”); see infra notes 165–68 and accompanying text. 
 91. Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 706 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 92. MODEL CODE OF EVID. R. 106 (AM. LAW INST. 1942). 
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undue prejudice when weighed against its probative value as an 
impeachment tool.93 
A decade later, the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws published the Uniform Rules of Evidence to promote 
uniformity across American jurisdictions.94 Like its predecessor, the 
Uniform Rules proposed strict limits on impeachment with prior 
convictions, protecting victim-witnesses and accused persons from 
improper collateral attacks on character. For witnesses other than the 
accused, Rule 21 proposed limiting conviction-based impeachment only to 
crimes “involving dishonesty or false statement.”95 The Uniform Rules 
equally emphasized the importance of judicial discretion for courts to 
exclude impeachment evidence deemed too prejudicial.96 Thus, the 
Uniform Rules protected victim-witnesses from egregious attacks on their 
character with prior convictions wholly unrelated to the narrow class of 
crimes involving dishonesty or false statement.97 At the same time, victims 
could be reassured that judges maintained discretion to prohibit unfair 
attacks, even with the narrowed class of convictions available. 
Therefore, by the latter half of the twentieth century, the common 
law’s open approach to making any criminal offense available to impeach 
witness credibility was slowly abandoned. At the same time, additional 
judicial safeguards for excluding convictions bearing little value in 
foretelling a witness’s truthfulness when measured against the harm to the 
witness were widely embraced. 
 
 93. MODEL CODE OF EVID. R. 303 (AM. LAW INST. 1942); see also Green v. Bock Laundry 
Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 513 (1989) (citing Rule 303 and noting its interplay with Rule 106 of 
the Model Code of Evidence by allowing any unduly prejudicial evidence to be excluded, 
including prior-conviction evidence used for impeachment purposes). 
 94. See Proceedings of the National Conference on Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 
62 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 
36, 102–03 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1953) (documenting the Commissioners’ decision to adopt the 
Uniform Rules of Evidence in 1953); Leonard S. Powers, The North Carolina Hearsay Rule and 
the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 34 N.C. L. REV. 171, 171–72 (1956). The goal of the Uniform 
Rules of Evidence was twofold: uniformity and acceptability. Id. at 172. Whereas the Model 
Code of Evidence had been rejected by legislatures and courts as “too drastic” or “too academic,” 
the Uniform Rules of Evidence were drafted to be slanted more toward practicing lawyers and 
judges than academics. Id. at 171, 172–73 n.10. 
 95. UNIF. R. EVID. 21. If the witness was the accused in a criminal trial, prior-conviction 
evidence was barred unless the defendant opened the door by offering evidence “solely for the 
purpose of supporting his credibility.” Id. 
 96. See id. at 7, 45; see also Green, 490 U.S. at 513. 
 97. See UNIF. R. EVID. 21. Similarly, limits on using prior convictions against the accused 
were intended to “correct the abuse of smearing rather than discrediting a defendant who takes the 
stand” that were as well known then as they are now. Id. at 21 cmt. 
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D. Competing Theories and Compromise: Federal Rule 609 
When Congress debated the Federal Rules of Evidence, no one 
questioned the general premise that a previously convicted individual 
would be more willing to lie on the witness stand than the average person.98 
The primary debate centered on which convictions most implicated witness 
untruthfulness and whether judicial discretion to exclude convictions 
should be permitted.99 When deciding these questions, two competing 
interests beset rule drafters: affording fair trials to those at the mercy of the 
justice system and supporting society’s interest in protecting itself against 
criminals.100 
The original rule crafted by the Advisory Committee on the Federal 
Rules of Evidence erred on the side of societal interests in prosecuting 
cases.101 Proposed Rule 6–09 called for mandatory admission of all crimes 
“punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year” (i.e., felonies) 
and any crime involving “dishonesty or false statement” (crimen falsi 
offenses), no matter the punishment, when offered for the purpose of 
attacking the witness’s credibility.102 The rule embraced two separate 
 
 98. See Advisory Committee’s Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for United 
States District Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 297 (1969) (“A demonstrated instance of 
willingness to engage in conduct in disregard of accepted patterns is translatable into willingness 
to give false testimony.”); see also Berger, supra note 19, at 205 (noting the legislative history of 
Rule 609 demonstrates the psychological assumptions about predictive human behavior based on 
prior criminal conduct was accepted “as so seemingly obvious as to be beyond debate” without 
concern for whether the study of psychology actually supported the underlying assumption); 
Green, supra note 38, at 1114 (“[T]here appears to have been virtually no discussion of the 
underlying premise that a person who has been convicted of either a crime of deceit or some other 
serious crime is unworthy of belief.”). Yet recent empirical studies reveal that prior criminal 
records do not implicate credibility. Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 15, at 1387–88. 
 99. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REC. 1414 (1974) (listing all the proposals considered for which 
convictions to allow for impeachment and discussing judicial discretion); Victor Gold, 
Impeachment by Conviction Evidence: Judicial Discretion and the Politics of Rule 609, 15 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2295, 2298 (1993). 
 100. For example, Representative Hogan stated during the House’s discussion on Rule 609(a) 
that “[t]he raging debate over impeachment of the accused’s credibility by conviction of a crime 
exemplifies the continual attempt by all involved in the judicial system to balance the scales of 
justice between the rights of the individual and the rights of society.” 120 CONG. REC. 1414 
(1974); see also Gold, supra note 99, at 2303; see generally Bellin, Circumventing Congress, 
supra note 8, at 304–07 (chronicling the Advisory Committee’s attempts to craft a rule balancing 
competing interests and public policies impacted by conviction-based impeachment). 
 101. See Advisory Committee’s Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the 
United States District Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 295–96 (1969) (allowing admission 
of prior convictions without mentioning a judge’s discretion to exclude for reasons of unfair 
prejudice); see also Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 515 (1989) (discussing the 
historical development of Rule 609). 
 102. See Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 269 
(1973); Advisory Committee’s Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United 
States District Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 295–96 (1969). The proposed rule did not 
include judicial discretion to exclude these categories of crimes, limiting their availability only to 
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theories. First, felony convictions of any nature were endorsed on the 
premise that the severity of the crime implicitly made the witness more 
likely to testify falsely.103 The fact that the crime bore no rational relation to 
one’s veracity, may have been the subject of an honest confession, or 
closely mirrored the charged offense did not affect admissibility.104 
Separately, crimen falsi convictions were sanctioned on the theory that 
commission of a crime involving falsity or deceit directly exhibited 
mendacious character and a propensity to lie.105 Importantly, proposed Rule 
6–09 deviated from the common law’s broad approach to witness 
impeachment by excluding most misdemeanor offenses. The Advisory 
Committee deemed the exclusion of misdemeanors unrelated to dishonest 
acts as “warranted by their relatively insubstantial nature.”106 
After settling on the convictions available for impeachment, the next 
question concerned whether the rule would grant trial courts the authority 
to exclude those they judged unfairly prejudicial. The Advisory Committee 
vacillated on the issue. The rule’s varying iterations proposed denying or 
granting trial courts latitude to exclude a witness’s prior convictions to 
safeguard against unfair prejudice to the witness.107 Under pressure from a 
single, albeit powerful, Senator who opposed the draft rule,108 the final 
 
staleness concerns. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 
269–70 (1973). The proposed rule essentially mirrored the District of Colombia Code passed by 
Congress in 1970 only a few years prior. Green, 490 U.S. at 514–15. 
 103. See Advisory Committee’s Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the 
United States District Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 297 (1969) (concluding that major 
crimes suggest a “willingness to engage in conduct in disregard of accepted patterns [that] is 
translatable into willingness to give false testimony” (emphasis added)). 
 104. See id. (conceding that “it may be argued that considerations of relevancy should limit 
provable convictions to those of crimes of untruthfulness”). 
 105. See Advisory Committee’s Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the 
United States Courts and Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315, 391 (1971) (adhering to the traditional view 
that crimen falsi offenses are relevant to credibility “without regard to the grade of the offense”). 
 106. Advisory Committee’s Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United 
States District Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 297 (1969). 
 107. See, e.g., Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and 
Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315, 391 (1971) (supplementing the 1969 rule by adding “in either case, 
the judge determines that the probative value of the evidence of the crime is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice”). The final version was modeled after recent 
congressional action that had stripped judicial discretion from impeachment rules applicable 
under the District of Columbia Code. See Green, 490 U.S. at 516–18 (detailing the development 
of 609 and discussing its relation to the District of Columbia Code); Gold, supra note 99, at 
2298–01 (chronicling the various Rule 609 iterations). 
 108. See Gold, supra note 99, at 2300–01 (describing Senator John McClellan’s reaction to 
the Advisory Committee’s proposal and the Committee’s decision to relent for the betterment of 
preserving the entire rules drafting effort). 
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version submitted to Congress simply left open the question of trial court 
discretion by making no reference to judicial balancing.109 
The ensuing congressional debate over the rule governing conviction-
based impeachment dwarfed all others in the rulemaking process.110 The 
two chambers essentially split the Advisory Committee’s proposal. The 
House adopted an approach consistent with the Uniform Rules of Evidence 
by limiting impeachment solely to crimes involving dishonesty or false 
statement.111 The House Judiciary Committee observed that including 
convictions for any additional crimes raised the danger of unfair 
prejudice112 and, notably, that expanded impeachment would have a 
deterrent effect on all witnesses.113 A divided Senate, however, narrowly 
approved admitting all felony convictions and lesser crimes involving 
dishonesty or false statement, without judicial discretion to exclude 
either.114 
Congressional negotiators eventually wed the House and Senate 
proposals together into a single, albeit complex, rule.115 As adopted, 
Federal Rule 609 made admissible for impeachment all crimes involving 
dishonesty or false statement without trial court discretion to consider 
unfair prejudice.116 The rule also embraced impeachment with felony 
convictions, subject to a heightened test, balancing unfair prejudice when 
offered against an accused person.117 In a notable departure from the 
 
 109. See Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 269–70 
(1973). The final proposed version arguably left the question open by not mandating admission of 
all felonies and crimen falsi offenses. The proposed rule merely indicated that a conviction of 
those types “is” admissible rather than “shall be admitted.” Id. Suffice it to say, the Advisory 
Committee wanted out of the fight and for Congress to take on the issue in debate. 
 110. See Gold, supra note 99, at 2303 (“The extent of the floor debate in the House over Rule 
609(a) far exceeded that relating to any other provision in all the proposed Federal Rules of 
Evidence.” (citing 120 CONG. REC. 1414–15, 2375–81 (1974))). 
 111. See 120 CONG. REC. 2381 (1974) (rejecting the amendment that would add non-crimen 
falsi felony convictions to 609(a)); see also Diggs v. Lyons, 741 F.2d 577, 580 (3d Cir. 1984); 
Gold supra note 99, at 2302–04. 
 112. H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 11 (1973), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7084–85 
(“[B]ecause of the danger of unfair prejudice . . . and the deterrent effect upon an accused who 
might wish to testify, and even upon a witness who [is] not the accused, cross-examination of 
prior conviction should be limited to those kinds of convictions bearing directly on credibility, 
i.e., crimes involving dishonesty or false statement.” (emphasis added)). 
 113. See id. 
 114. See 120 CONG. REC. 37076, 37083 (1974); see also Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 
490 U.S. 504, 519 (1989); Gold, supra note 99, at 2304–07. 
 115. See FED. R. EVID. 609(a) (1975) (Rule 609 as originally enacted); Bellin, Circumventing 
Congress, supra note 8, at 306–07; Gold, supra note 99, at 2307–08. 
 116. See FED. R. EVID. 609(a) (1975) (Rule 609 as originally enacted); Gold, supra note 99, 
at 2308 n.61. 
 117. See FED. R. EVID. 609(a) (1975) (Rule 609 as originally enacted); Gold, supra note 99, 
at 2308 n.61. Notwithstanding these textual protections, the factors courts have developed 
generally tend to admit prior-conviction evidence for impeachment when offered against accused 
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common law tradition, all misdemeanor offenses not involving dishonesty 
or false statements were rejected for impeachment purposes.118 
As originally enacted, Rule 609(a) left unclear whether trial courts 
maintained discretion to exclude felony convictions for witnesses other 
than those testifying on behalf of the criminal defendant—including the 
victim herself.119 Unsurprisingly, courts split over the issue.120 In 1990, the 
Advisory Committee proposed softening the rule’s impact on all witnesses 
by broadly embracing trial court discretion to exclude felony convictions 
unrelated to dishonest acts.121 The Committee noted that all witnesses have 
an interest in being protected against unfair attacks with prior-conviction 
evidence.122 It also accepted that some cases necessarily demand 
considering the impact of conviction-based impeachment on government 
witnesses.123  
Pointing to sexual assault cases, the Committee concluded that 
impeaching victim-witnesses with “prior convictions that have little, if 
anything, to do with credibility may result in unfair prejudice to the 
government’s interest in a fair trial and unnecessary embarrassment of the 
witness.”124 Congress agreed, adopting the inclusion of trial court discretion 
for all witnesses without public debate.125 
Today, Federal Rule of Evidence 609 represents a marked departure 
from former conviction-based impeachment practices.126 Witnesses may 
 
persons. The effect has been to eviscerate congressional intent discouraging the use of 
convictions against defendants. See generally Bellin, Circumventing Congress, supra note 8, at 
307–19 (describing the application of judge’s discretion and detailing factor tests that judges 
imposed on Rule 609). 
 118. See FED. R. EVID. 609(a) (1975) (Rule 609 as originally enacted). 
 119. Green, 490 U.S. at 505; Diggs v. Lyons, 741 F.2d 577, 580–81 (3d Cir. 1984) 
(describing the debate over Rule 609 and its applicability to all witnesses and all types of cases). 
 120. See David A. Sonenshein, Circuit Roulette: The Use of Prior Convictions to Impeach 
Credibility in Civil Cases Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 279, 
284–85 (1988) (detailing the conflict among the circuits concerning trial court discretion, or lack 
thereof, to exclude felony convictions when offered to impeach witnesses in civil cases). 
 121. Amendments to Federal Rules of Evidence—Rule 609, 129 F.R.D. 347, 353–54 (1990). 
 122. Id. at 353 (“The danger from the use of prior convictions is not confined to criminal 
defendants.”). 
 123. Id. at 354 (rejecting the suggestion that government witnesses should not be afforded 
protection against unfair prejudice from conviction-based impeachment). 
 124. Id. 
 125. See Federal Rules of Evidence: Amendment to Rule 609(a)(1) and (2), 132 F.R.D. 307, 
307 (1991) (giving notice of the amendment); Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence—
Rule 609, 129 F.R.D. 347, 352 (1990); Gold, supra note 99, at 2307–09. 
 126. See FED. R. EVID. 609; Bellin, Circumventing Congress, supra note 8, at 307–08 (“As a 
preliminary matter, the Rule represents a sweeping departure from prior federal law, 
unequivocally rejecting the automatic admissibility of felony convictions that had previously been 
the federal norm.”). 
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not be impeached with just any prior conviction.127 Automatic admission of 
prior-conviction evidence applies only to crimes that require proving (or 
the witness’s admitting) dishonesty or false statement as an element.128 
Felony convictions may be admitted only after satisfying judicial balancing 
tests designed to safeguard against unfair prejudice.129 A vast number of 
lesser misdemeanor crimes are made inadmissible for impeaching witness 
credibility.130 That is not to say the rule is without fault. Appropriately, 
scholars have criticized the rule’s impact on accused persons131 and the 
judiciary’s abandonment of the protections the rule textually affords.132 
Compared to its North Carolina counterpart, however, Federal Rule 609 
represents significant reform that at least attempts to minimize the harmful 
effects accorded by conviction-based impeachment. 
In the next part, this Article explores how North Carolina’s adherence 
to broad conviction-based impeachment has remained essentially unaltered 
for more than a century. While evidence rules throughout the country have 
evolved to contend with the undeniable impact of prior-conviction evidence 
on all witnesses, North Carolina impeachment rules have not. Part II offers 
a comprehensive analysis of the state’s permissive impeachment practices 
dating from the common law to current statutory evidence rules. By 
revealing the General Assembly’s ongoing conformance to ancient dogma, 
coupled with the judiciary’s recalcitrance to embracing modest witness 
protection measures, Part II sets the stage for discussing how North 
Carolina Rule 609 negatively impacts victims and their participation in the 
judicial system. 
II.  NORTH CAROLINA’S BROAD APPROACH TO WITNESS IMPEACHMENT 
North Carolina impeachment practices remain beholden to antiquated 
traditions long since abandoned as unfounded or harmful. Today, 
unfettered use of prior-conviction evidence to impeach witness credibility 
has been discarded at the federal level and in almost every state. Most 
 
 127. See FED. R. EVID. 609 (limiting conviction-based impeachment solely to felony 
convictions and crimen falsi offenses); Bellin, Circumventing Congress, supra note 8, at 308. 
 128. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2). 
 129. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1). For non-criminal defendant-witnesses, felony convictions must 
pass muster applying Rule 403 scrutiny whereas prosecutors must demonstrate that felony 
convictions are more probative than prejudicial when used to impeach criminal defendant-
witnesses. Id. 
 130. FED. R. EVID. 609(a). 
 131. See sources cited supra note 8. 
 132. See generally Bellin, Circumventing Congress, supra note 8, at 289 (“This article 
spotlights the flawed analytical framework at the heart of the federal courts’ approach to one of 
the most controversial trial practices in American criminal jurisprudence—the admission of prior 
convictions to impeach the credibility of defendants to testify.”). 
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states employ a balanced approach that corresponds to the federal rule in 
form and application.133 Several have adopted stricter standards.134 Hawaii 
and Montana, for example, forbid witness impeachment with prior-
conviction evidence.135 Those permitting conviction-based impeachment 
often impose strict limits on the types of convictions utilized.136 The nature 
of the offense and witness being impeached are determinative factors.137 
Notably, trial courts widely embrace discretion to exclude convictions that 
would unfairly prejudice the witness, even in jurisdictions that otherwise 
restrict conviction-based impeachment.138 
 
 133. Julia Simon-Kerr, Moral Turpitude, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1001, 1035 [hereinafter Simon-
Kerr, Moral Turpitude] (noting that a majority of states have now joined the federal rule either 
through statutory enactment or judicial decisions). 
 134. See ALASKA R. EVID. 609 (LEXIS through Feb. 15, 2019 amendments); CONN. CODE 
EVID. ANN. § 6-7 (Westlaw through Feb. 1, 2019 amendments); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-421 
(Westlaw through 2019 Leg. Sess.); KY. R. EVID. 609 (Westlaw Apr. 1, 2019 amendments); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 21 (Westlaw through ch. 9 of the 2019 1st Ann. Sess.); MICH. 
R. EVID. 609 (Westlaw through Feb. 1, 2019 amendments); NEV. REV. STAT. § 50.095 (Westlaw 
through ch. 2 of the 80th Reg. Sess. 2019); TEX. R. EVID. 609 (Westlaw through Mar. 1, 2019 
amendments); W. VA. R. EVID. 609 (Westlaw through Dec. 1, 2018 amendments). 
 135. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 626-1 R. 609 (Westlaw through Act 27 of the 2019 Reg. Sess.); 
MONT. R. EVID. 609 (Westlaw through the 2019 Sess.); State v. Santiago, 492 P.2d 657, 661 
(Haw. 1971) (holding that admission of prior convictions to impeach criminal defendants’ 
credibility unreasonably imposes on defendants’ right to testify). 
 136. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 21 (Westlaw through ch. 9 of the 2019 1st Ann. 
Sess.); MICH. R. EVID. 609 (Westlaw through Feb. 1, 2019 amendments); NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 50.095 (Westlaw through ch. 2 of the 80th Reg. Sess. 2019); TEX. R. EVID. 609 (Westlaw 
through Mar. 1, 2019 amendments); W. VA. R. EVID. 609 (Westlaw through Dec. 1, 2018 
amendments). 
 137. See ALA. R. EVID. 609 (Westlaw through Mar. 15, 2019 amendments); ALASKA R. EVID. 
609 (LEXIS through Feb. 15, 2019 amendments); ARIZ. R. EVID. 609 (Westlaw through Feb. 1, 
2019 amendments); ARK. R. EVID. 609 (LEXIS through 2019 legislation); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 90.610 (West 2010); GA. CODE. ANN. § 24-6-609 (2013) (LEXIS through 2019 legislation); 
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626-1 R. 609 (Westlaw through Act 27 of the 2019 Reg. Sess.); IDAHO 
R. EVID. 609 (LEXIS through 2019 legislation); IND. R. EVID. 609 (Westlaw through Mar. 1, 2019 
amendments); IOWA R. EVID. 5.609 (Westlaw through Feb. 1, 2019 amendments); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 21 (Westlaw through ch. 9 of the 2019 1st Ann. Sess.); MICH. R. EVID. 609 
(Westlaw through Feb. 1, 2019 amendments); N.H. R. EVID. 609 (Westlaw through Apr. 15, 2019 
amendments); N.J. R. EVID. 609 (Westlaw current through May 1, 2019 amendments); N.D. R. 
EVID. 609 (LEXIS through Apr. 16, 2019 amendments); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2609 
(Westlaw through ch. 179 of the 1st Reg. Sess. of the 57th Leg.); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.355 
(Westlaw through July 1, 2019 amendments); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-19-609 (Westlaw 
through 2019 Reg. Sess.); TENN. R. EVID. 609 (LEXIS through Mar. 25, 2019 amendments); 
UTAH R. EVID. 609 (LEXIS through 2019 legislation); VT. R. EVID. 609 (LEXIS through 2019 
legislation); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-269 (2015); W. VA. R. EVID. 609 (Westlaw through Dec. 1, 
2018 amendments); WYO. R. EVID. 609 (LEXIS through 2019 legislation). 
 138. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 21 (Westlaw through ch. 9 of the 2019 1st 
Ann. Sess.); Commonwealth v. Harris, 825 N.E.2d 58, 68 (Mass. 2005) (concluding that prior 
convictions for sex-related offenses may be admitted for impeachment purposes notwithstanding 
the state’s rape shield statute, given the trial court’s discretion to preclude unfairly prejudicial 
evidence). 
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North Carolina is an outlier in every respect. The North Carolina 
General Assembly rejected the modest protections afforded by the federal 
rule when crafting the corresponding state rule on conviction-based 
impeachment.139 Since then, North Carolina courts have exacerbated the 
rule’s negative effects by abandoning rules enabling trial court discretion to 
protect witnesses against prejudicial use of conviction evidence.140 
Survivors of domestic and sexual assault, in particular, suffer the 
consequences of the state’s ongoing broad approach to impeachment, 
which has been almost universally abandoned in common law jurisdictions 
contemplating the propriety of conviction-based impeachment.141 
A. Historical Antecedents to Witness Impeachment 
North Carolina adheres to the ancient assumption that persons 
convicted of crimes lack credibility in the general sense and are therefore 
more likely to lie when testifying as a witness.142 The rules governing 
conviction-based impeachment in North Carolina state courts today are 
largely indistinguishable from those developed at common law more than a 
century ago.143 To appreciate the state’s rigid adherence to primitive 
dogma, a brief history of North Carolina’s approach to witness 
disqualification and unrestricted impeachment is necessary. 
From its earliest existence, North Carolina perpetuated the English 
common law’s cynicism toward testimony given by previously convicted 
persons.144 Early decisions from the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
embraced absolute testimonial disqualification for any witness previously 
 
 139. See infra Section II.D. 
 140. See infra Section II.F. 
 141. See infra Part III. 
 142. See, e.g., Ingle v. Roy Stone Transfer Corp., 271 N.C. 276, 280, 156 S.E.2d 265, 269 
(1967) (confirming North Carolina as a state where general character for dishonest behavior may 
be used as an impeachment tool to suggest untruthful testimony); State v. Jones, 63 N.C. App. 
411, 421, 305 S.E.2d 221, 227 (1983) (finding that multiple traffic violations generally supported 
an attack on the witness’s credibility); James E. Sizemore, Character Evidence in Criminal Cases 
in North Carolina, 7 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 17, 22 (1970) (concluding that, under North Carolina 
law, “general bad character may be shown for purposes of impeachment”). 
 143. DALE F. STANSBURY, THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 112, at 210 (1st ed. 
1946). Analyzing North Carolina common law dating back to the mid 1800s, Stansbury 
concluded that “[a]pparently any sort of criminal offense may be inquired about” to impeach a 
witness’s credibility. Id. He would note as “wholesome,” however, later judicial dicta suggesting 
that “traffic violations and other offenses bearing no relation to credibility” arguably should not 
apply. Id. (citing State v. King, 224 N.C. 329, 332, 30 S.E.2d 230, 232 (1944)). The common 
law’s broad approach to allowing a wide range of conviction evidence to impeach witness 
credibility is remarkably similar to the current version of North Carolina Rule 609, which broadly 
permits impeachment with an array of convictions, except for minor traffic offenses and low-level 
misdemeanors. See N.C. R. EVID. 609. 
 144. See supra notes 40–56 and accompanying text. 
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convicted of a crime, no matter how material the witness’s testimony to a 
party’s case.145 Impeachment was not an option; persons previously 
convicted of crimes were deemed incompetent as witnesses and prohibited 
from testifying per se.146 In fact, the state’s first common law evidence 
rules categorically disqualified individuals from testifying for a host of 
reasons, including the witness’s status as a civil party or accused 
criminal.147 
The state’s approach to outright witness disqualification would not 
endure, however.148 By the mid-nineteenth century, most of the former 
impediments to witness qualification were dropped by statutory measures 
favoring witness testimony, subject to impeachment for the various reasons 
previously disabling the witness.149 Witnesses formerly disqualified from 
testifying because of their prior convictions were now free to offer their 
accounts in North Carolina courts.150 Doing so, however, exacted a personal 
toll. Although the General Assembly lifted the ban on receiving testimony 
from previously convicted persons, it placed no restrictions on the types of 
prior crimes available to impeach the witness.151 Any limitations on prior-
conviction evidence used to impeach a witness would thus come only at the 
hands of the judiciary. 
The judicial attitude toward emancipated witnesses recently freed 
from their former disqualifications, however, was unflinching. Throughout 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the state’s high court 
embraced wide-open impeachment, sanctioning unrestricted credibility 
 
 145. Keith v. Goodwin, 51 N.C. (1 Jones) 398, 398 (1859) (per curiam) (finding no error in 
the trial court’s exclusion of a material witness who had been previously convicted of 
manslaughter). 
 146. Id.; STANSBURY, supra note 143, § 53, at 87. 
 147. STANSBURY, supra note 143, § 53, at 87–88. North Carolina’s approach to witness 
competency echoed English common law by absolutely disqualifying “the defendant in a criminal 
case, all parties to a civil action or suit, the husband or wife of a party, and person interested in 
the event of the action, persons convicted of crimes, and infidels” as incompetent. Id. 
 148. The only remaining rigid form of witness disqualification today applies to interested 
witnesses in a lawsuit against an estate offering oral statements made by a decedent under the 
“Dead Man’s Statute.” See N.C. R. EVID. 601(c). This particular disqualification, however, is 
highly limited and easily waived by unwitting parties. See, e.g., In re Will of Baitschora, 207 
N.C. App. 174, 186, 700 S.E. 2d 50, 58 (2010). 
 149. STANSBURY, supra note 143, § 53, at 88. A series of statutory revisions in the mid- and 
late nineteenth century eventually abolished most of the categorical disqualifications, including a 
person’s status as a previously convicted criminal. Id. These largely mirrored the reforms adopted 
in England and other American jurisdictions favoring witness testimony subject to impeachment 
over witness disqualification. Ladd, supra note 77, at 174–75. 
 150. See An Act to Improve the Law of Evidence, ch. 43, pmbl. & § 1, 1866 N.C. Sess. Laws 
112, 112. 
 151. Although the Act to Improve the Law of Evidence proscribed automatic disqualification 
of witnesses with prior convictions, the Act did not restrict the scope of prior convictions that 
could be leveraged to impeach the witness. See id. 
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tests with prior criminal conduct.152 Few boundaries existed to protect 
against abuses. Witnesses could be cross-examined with prior criminal 
convictions, indictments, and some uncharged accusations.153 Over the 
decades, unfettered cross-examination became the norm. In State v. Beal154 
the court unanimously proclaimed, “Competency and credibility are two 
different things. A person may be a competent witness and yet not a 
credible one. The law declares his competency, but it cannot make him 
credible.”155 The Beal court exalted cross-examination as “one of the 
principal tests which the law has devised for the discovery of truth.”156 
Accordingly, the court pronounced that a witness’s interest, motives, 
prejudices, knowledge, and other matters bearing on credibility “may be 
fully investigated in the presence of the jury.”157 The court emphatically 
concluded that “[o]rdinarily, therefore, a witness may be asked any 
questions on cross-examination which tend to test his accuracy, to show his 
interest or bias, or to impeach his credibility.”158 
Although penned in 1930, Beal embodied the judicial attitude favoring 
unrestrained cross-examination that persisted throughout the century. The 
state’s supreme court would later characterize North Carolina cross-
examination as “rough-and-tumble”159 with “few holds barred,” hold that 
“questions relating to crime and anti-social conduct are freely allowed,” 
and confirm commentator observations that, when impeaching a witness in 
the state’s trial courts, “apparently any sort of criminal offense may be 
 
 152. See, e.g., State v. Simonds, 154 N.C. 197, 198, 69 S.E. 790, 790 (1910) (proclaiming that 
the ability to question a witness that has taken the stand with any crime he or she may have 
committed is “settled law”); State v. Thomas, 98 N.C. 599, 604–05, 1 S.E. 518, 521 (1887) 
(declaring that a witness who takes the stand, including the criminally accused, may be subjected 
“to the peril of being examined as to any and every matter pertinent to the issue” (emphasis 
added) (citing McGarry v. People, 2 Lans. 227, 227–34 (N.Y. Gen. Term. 1870))); State v. 
Lawhorn, 88 N.C. 634, 637 (1883) (“In this state, it is well settled that a witness may be asked on 
cross-examination whether he has not been convicted of offences calculated to affect his standing 
as a witness.”). 
 153. See, e.g., State v. Cureton, 215 N.C. 778, 781–83, 3 S.E.2d 343, 345–46 (1939) (finding 
no error in cross-examination questions posed to the defendant about being indicted as an 
accessory to murder in another case); State v. Maslin, 195 N.C. 537, 541, 143 S.E. 3, 6 (1928) 
(excluding mere accusations of crimes, but continuing to permit evidence of criminal indictments 
to impeach witness credibility); Thomas, 98 N.C. at 604–06, 1 S.E. at 519–21 (1887) (holding 
that questioning whether the witness had been accused of murder in another state was permissible 
to test the witness’s credibility). 
 154. 199 N.C. 278, 154 S.E. 604 (1930). 
 155. Id. at 300, 154 S.E. at 617. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 300–01, 154 S.E. at 617. 
 158. Id. at 301, 154 S.E. at 617 (emphasis added). 
 159. See, e.g., State v. King, 224 N.C. 329, 331–32, 30 S.E. 2d 230, 231 (1944). 
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inquired about.”160 The North Carolina common law viewed any act 
remotely bearing on the witness’s moral, ethical, social, or criminal 
character as fodder for cross-examination.161 
Further exacerbating the effects of unmitigated cross-examination, 
North Carolina also steadfastly refused to place any restrictions on the 
types of convictions available to impeach a witness’s credibility.162 This 
stance placed the state among a shrinking minority as other jurisdictions 
moved to curtail the prejudice inherent in unmitigated impeachment.163 
Initially, North Carolina’s open approach to impeaching witnesses with the 
bias, prejudice, and status that formerly disqualified the witness as 
incompetent was well within the norm for the era. The original statutes that 
removed testimonial disqualification for persons previously convicted of 
crimes tended to make the former impediment an open point of attack 
during cross-examination in virtually every jurisdiction.164 As early as the 
late nineteenth century, however, states began distinguishing between 
convictions generally and those that more closely impacted witness 
credibility; several restricted impeachment to crimes involving moral 
turpitude.165 This loosely defined standard encompassed acts that tended to 
 
 160. Ingle v. Roy Stone Transfer Corp., 271 N.C. 276, 280, 156 S.E.2d 265, 269 (1967) 
(quoting STANSBURY, supra note 143, § 112, at 210). The wide-open cross-examination approach 
permitted in North Carolina courts for testing witness credibility eventually devolved to utter 
absurdity. As one commentator noted, prosecutors were permitted to question witnesses on 
adulterous liaisons, performing abortions, and calling the district attorney a “punk.” Gary R. 
Govert, Evidence—Stuck in a Serbonian Bog: State v. Jean and the Future of Character 
Impeachment in North Carolina, 63 N.C. L. REV. 535, 539 (1985) (first citing State v. Small, 301 
N.C. 407, 432–33, 272 S.E.2d 128, 143 (1980); then citing State v. Broom, 222 N.C. 324, 325, 22 
S.E.2d 926, 927 (1942); and then citing State v. Lynch, 300 N.C. 534, 543, 268 S.E. 161, 166–67 
(1980)). 
 161. STANSBURY, supra note 143, § 111, at 209 (observing that, under North Carolina 
common law, “[a]ll kinds of disparaging facts may be elicited” on cross-examination when 
impeaching a witness’s credibility). 
 162. See, e.g., Ingle, 271 N.C. at 280, 156 S.E.2d at 268–69 (reaffirming the North Carolina 
rule that any conviction may be used to impeach witness credibility, including acts that have not 
resulted in a conviction); State v. Sims, 213 N.C. 590, 593, 197 S.E. 176, 178 (1938) (refusing to 
recognize any limitations on the type of convictions, or any other conduct, when cross-examining 
a witness’s credibility). 
 163. See Ingle, 271 N.C. at 280–82, 156 S.E.2d at 269–70 (noting, somewhat disdainfully, the 
movement within other states towards limiting impeachment by conviction evidence to various 
standards aimed at linking crimes to veracity); King, 224 N.C. at 332, 30 S.E.2d at 232 
(conceding that “[i]n many jurisdictions questions as to commission of crime are not permitted at 
all, unless addressed to those offenses which have an obvious relation to the virtue of veracity”). 
 164. Ladd, supra note 77, at 174–75 (“Both in England and in this country the incompetency 
has been removed by statute, with but few exceptions, but usually by the same act it is provided 
that the conviction of a crime shall thereafter be admissible as a test of the credibility of the 
witness.”). 
 165. Simon-Kerr, Credibility by Proxy, supra note 90, at 172 (detailing the late nineteenth-
century movement to adopt “moral turpitude” as the standard for conviction-based impeachment, 
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condemn the individual as a social outcast.166 While rudimentary, the 
“moral turpitude” standard first began sifting between crimes that might 
correlate to an individual’s dishonorable character and those bearing no 
relationship to veracity whatsoever.167 Similarly, some jurisdictions 
curtailed impeachment practices by designating “infamous” crimes or 
felonies as a mechanism for delineating between convictions suggestive of 
a witness’s character for untruthfulness.168 North Carolina law would not 
evolve likewise, however. 
In 1938, the Supreme Court of North Carolina decided State v. Sims,169 
firmly echoing Justice Holmes’s then fifty-year-old theory that a conviction 
of any kind was pertinent to inferring witness untruthfulness.170 As 
previously discussed, Holmes believed criminal convictions generally 
revealed a witness’s dishonest character from which the jury could infer 
perjured testimony.171 According to this logic, any conviction would 
suffice. The Sims court agreed, stating flatly that “[i]t is not the practice in 
this jurisdiction to limit the cross-examination for the purpose of 
impeachment to felonies, or to crimes involving moral turpitude.”172 A 
conviction of any kind remained viable for impeaching the witness under 
the theory that “a bad man probably includes lying among his vices.”173 
Convictions for injury to property,174 public drunkenness,175 disorderly 
 
in states including Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Texas, California, Connecticut, Louisiana, 
Maine, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Vermont, and Wyoming). 
 166. Simon-Kerr, Moral Turpitude, supra note 133, at 1025–39 (chronicling moral turpitude 
as rooted in civil slander before evolving into an impeachment standard under the rules of 
evidence within numerous American jurisdictions). 
 167. Simon-Kerr, Credibility by Proxy, supra note 90, at 171. At the time, gender stereotypes 
and misogyny played a central role in distinguishing the “moral turpitude” associated with the 
individual witness being impeached. Id. As Professor Simon-Kerr eloquently describes, moral 
turpitude “embodied many of the country’s self-conscious norms of conduct, such as notions that 
oath-breaking and disloyalty in men and sexual impurity in women were particularly damning to 
reputation.” Id. At a minimum, however, the standard did at least distinguish between petty 
crimes and those more indicative of mendacious character. Id. at 172 n.109. 
 168. Ladd, supra note 77, at 175 (observing that statutes encompassed an array of specific 
limitations on the types of convictions available for impeachment, including felonies, infamous 
crimes, those involving moral turpitude, and misdemeanors of a particular nature). 
 169. 213 N.C. 590, 197 S.E. 176 (1938). 
 170. Id. at 593, 197 S.E. at 178. Under Holmes’s theory, conviction evidence demonstrated in 
the witness a “general readiness to do evil” from which the jury could “infer a readiness to lie in 
the particular case.” Gertz v. Fitchburg R.R., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884). 
 171. See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text. 
 172. Sims, 213 N.C. at 593, 197 S.E. at 178. The court would further state that cross-
examination “is not limited to crimes” and that any act tending to impeach the witness’s character 
was cross-examination fodder. Id. 
 173. 1 HENRY BRANDIS, Jr., BRANDIS ON NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 107, at 398 (2d ed. 
1982). 
 174. See, e.g., State v. Blackwell, 276 N.C. 714, 724, 174 S.E.2d 534, 541 (1970). 
 175. See, e.g., id.  
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conduct,176 unlawful possession of liquor,177 motor vehicle offenses,178 and 
traffic violations179 all branded the witness as a liar as equally as 
convictions for embezzlement or perjury.180 
The unapologetic adherence to limitless conviction-based 
impeachment prevailed in North Carolina throughout the twentieth century, 
even as its viability waned.181 While other states and federal courts moved 
to rein in impeachment abuses, particularly against the criminally accused, 
North Carolina jurisprudence remained firmly entrenched.182 The Supreme 
Court of North Carolina in Ingle v. Roy Stone Transfer Corp.183 recoiled at 
the burgeoning movement toward restricting the scope and nature of 
criminal convictions available for impeaching witnesses.184 While readily 
acknowledging that unrestrained conviction-based impeachment was being 
abandoned throughout the country, the court reviled these reforms as 
injecting uncertainty, pithily declaring, “Thus does the serpent of 
 
 176. See, e.g., id. 
 177. See, e.g., State v. King, 224 N.C. 329, 331, 334, 30 S.E. 230, 231, 233 (1944) (holding 
that impeaching a witness with a litany of criminal convictions, including possession of liquor 
and disorderly conduct, was proper but the trial court’s exclusion of the records supporting the 
convictions was not an abuse of discretion). 
 178. See, e.g., State v. Atkinson, 39 N.C. App. 575, 580, 251 S.E.2d 677, 681 (1979) 
(upholding a prosecutor’s use of the defendant’s multiple prior motor vehicle convictions as 
proper conviction-based impeachment “relevant to show [the] defendant’s repeated and abiding 
contempt for the law and, thereby, his lack of trustworthiness”). 
 179. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 63 N.C. App. 411, 421, 305 S.E.2d 221, 227 (1983) (upholding 
the trial court’s decision to admit the defendant’s entire twenty-five year driving record, showing 
traffic violations dating back to 1956, as “relevant to show defendant’s lack of credibility”). 
 180. As Dean Ladd observed in 1940, impeachment by prior conviction is not based on any 
specific tendency of the witness to falsify his testimony. See Ladd, supra note 77, at 176. Rather, 
it serves primarily to “brand the witness with the stigma of distrust” in the purely general sense. 
Id. Yet classifying drunkenness, running a red light, or failing to pay a parking ticket as 
convictions that suggest untruthfulness “is nonsense” whereas crimes involving actual falsity may 
actually be useful to testing the witness’s credibility. Id. at 182. 
 181. See, e.g., King, 224 N.C. at 332, 30 S.E.2d at 232 (conceding that “[i]n many 
jurisdictions questions as to commission of crime are not permitted at all, unless addressed to 
those offenses which have an obvious relation to the virtue of veracity”); Sizemore, supra note 
142, at 22 (“In many states, the inquiry into past criminal conduct and convictions is limited to 
those types of crimes which reflect on truth and veracity, such as fraud, forgery, embezzlement, 
perjury, and the like. However, in North Carolina, where general bad character may be shown for 
purposes of impeachment, no such limitation is observed.”). 
 182. In fact, the court would take the opposite approach to addressing the prejudice to a 
person criminally accused when impeached with a litany of prior criminal convictions. Rather 
than recognizing the obvious likelihood that the jury would convict based on the prior 
convictions, the court claimed impeaching a defendant with prior convictions was more probative 
to the defendant lying on the witness stand because he “has a direct interest in the outcome of the 
case.” State v. Ross, 295 N.C. 488, 493, 246 S.E.2d 780, 784 (1978). The court apparently failed 
to recognize that the defendant’s bias as a witness with a stake in the outcome would be true 
regardless of his status as a prior-convicted person. 
 183. 271 N.C. 276, 156 S.E.2d 265 (1967). 
 184. See id. at 280–82, 156 S.E.2d at 269–70. 
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uncertainty crawl into the Eden of trial administration.”185 Limitations 
recognized by other courts were chastised as “oversensitive . . . to the 
feelings of the witnesses.”186 Offering trial courts discretion to exclude 
convictions was deemed “inexpedient.”187 Instead, the Ingle court 
unabashedly maintained that one’s general character for mendacity could 
be derived from any criminal conviction, including violations of motor 
vehicle laws.188 According to the court, holding steadfast to unrestrained 
use of convictions to attack witness credibility had the “virtue of 
certainty.”189 The reforms aimed at associating convictions with untruthful 
behavior were acknowledged and then summarily rejected.190 
The Ingle court was equally recalcitrant to concerns that the 
unchecked use of prior-conviction evidence would raise the specter of 
unfair prejudice, even when applied to the defendant-witness. By the time 
Ingle was decided, commentators accepted that jurors were prone to using 
conviction evidence beyond gauging an accused person’s testimony but 
also (if not primarily) for the defendant’s propensity to commit the charged 
crime.191 The court chose to absolve itself of these misuses by claiming 
“[j]urors are intelligent people” and “[r]esponsible counsel will not abuse 
it.”192 Yet, North Carolina cases are replete with examples of defendants 
being cross-examined with a host of prior convictions not relevant to 
untruthfulness, without an assessment of the obvious potential for jurors to 
 
 185. Id. at 281, 156 S.E.2d at 269 (quoting CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE 
LAW OF EVIDENCE § 43, at 90–91 (1954)). 
 186. Id. at 280, 156 S.E.2d at 269. 
 187. Id. at 281, 156 S.E.2d at 269. 
 188. Id. at 281–82, 156 S.E.2d at 270. The Ingle court conceded that the limits proposed 
within the Uniform Rules of Evidence were perhaps better than others for confining convictions 
more closely to untruthful criminal behavior, yet held fast to the proposition that anything less 
than an “unblemished general character” was fodder for cross-examination of a person’s 
credibility, including motor vehicle laws. Id. at 281–82, 156 S.E.2d at 269–70.  
 189. Id. at 282, 156 S.E.2d at 270. 
 190. Id. at 281–82, 156 S.E.2d at 270 (conceding the propriety of limiting impeachment to 
convictions for crimes involving dishonesty or false statements as proposed by the Uniform Rules 
of Evidence but deciding that a conviction of any sort could still “cast some doubt” on the 
witness’s credibility). 
 191. See Ladd, supra note 77, at 184–86 (noting how the defendant-witness is left in the 
unenviable position of choosing between remaining silent and the “reasonable speculation” that 
the jury will use conviction evidence for “the propensity of the accused to commit the crime as 
well as to falsity”); see also Erwin N. Griswold, The Long View, 51 A.B.A. J. 1017, 1021 (1965) 
(noting the defendant’s “two almost hopeless alternatives” and the obvious impact on jurors 
confronted with prior convictions offered against an accused—no matter the instructions to the 
contrary); Sizemore, supra note 142, at 17 (observing that when “character evidence is paraded 
before the jury there is a natural inclination to reward a good man or to punish a bad man, 
regardless of the merits of the particular case”). 
 192. Ingle, 271 N.C. at 282, 156 S.E.2d at 270. 
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misuse them as circumstantial evidence of guilt.193 Even when offering 
occasional statements in dicta that trial courts have authority to curb abuses 
and discretion to prevent cross-examination from going “too far,” appellate 
decisions reiterated the open impeachment rule with conviction evidence.194 
As one scholar aptly concluded, “North Carolina courts do not directly 
consider the prejudicial effect of impeachment evidence, nor do courts limit 
cross-examination to serious crimes or those bearing on veracity.”195 
Instead, North Carolina courts assigned the task of balancing the prejudice 
associated with conviction-based impeachment to the same jury asked to 
convict.196 Ignoring the obvious impact on witnesses confronted by their 
past misdeeds was one of several failures of North Carolina’s Wild West 
impeachment practice. A victim had to choose between testifying and 
having her entire criminal record paraded before the jury or withdrawing 
and having her attacker go unpunished.197 
As the judiciary remained entrenched in regressive impeachment 
practices, the best opportunity for reform became a state evidence code 
crafted to resemble the Model Code or Federal Rules of Evidence. In the 
early 1980s, rules drafters set to that task with hopes of improving the 
complicated rules and outmoded traditions that had come to define 
common law evidence in North Carolina. 
 
 193. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 357 N.C. 382, 390, 584 S.E.2d 278, 283 (2003) (finding no 
error in the court’s admission of the defendant’s prior “malicious wounding” conviction despite 
its obvious potential for juror misuse in a case alleging murder); State v. Blackwell, 276 N.C. 
714, 724, 174 S.E.2d 534, 541 (1970) (finding no prejudice in the admission of convictions for 
injury to property, public intoxication, disorderly conduct, and violation of prohibition laws); 
State v. Neal, 222 N.C. 546, 547, 23 S.E.2d 911, 912 (1943) (finding no error in the trial court’s 
decision to admit “various infractions” including “larceny, vagrancy, nuisance and violation of 
the prohibition law” without weighing the prejudice to the witness or the fact that none of the 
convictions had any bearing on untruthfulness); State v. Jones, 63 N.C. App. 411, 421, 305 
S.E.2d 221, 227 (1983) (finding no error in the trial court’s decision to admit the defendant’s 
fourteen traffic offenses over a twenty-five year span to impeach the defendant’s credibility in 
case alleging vehicular manslaughter). 
 194. See, e.g., Blackwell, 276 N.C. at 726, 174 S.E.2d at 541; Neal, 222 N.C. at 547, 23 
S.E.2d at 912 (upholding the use of multiple convictions unrelated to veracity while suggesting 
that “whether the cross-examination goes too far or is unfair is a matter for the determination of 
the trial judge”). 
 195. Thomas C. Manning, Impeachment: The Dilemma of the Defendant-Witness in North 
Carolina, 13 N.C. CENT. L.J. 35, 36–37 (1981); see, e.g., Jones, 63 N.C. App. at 421, 305 S.E.2d 
at 227 (1983) (finding defendant’s fourteen traffic violations over a twenty-five-year span was 
“admissible for impeachment, and [was] relevant to show defendant’s lack of credibility”). 
 196. Manning, supra note 195, at 37 (“The burden of balancing the prejudice of character 
impeachment against its probative value falls largely upon the jury.”). 
 197. See Michael W. Patrick, Toward a Codification of the Law of Evidence in North 
Carolina, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 669, 694 (1980) (characterizing North Carolina’s 
unrestricted conviction-based practice as “seriously undermin[ing] the policy against use of 
character and misconduct as circumstantial evidence”). 
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B. Adopting an Evidence Code: Opportunity for Reform 
By the latter half of the twentieth century, North Carolina’s need for a 
reformed evidence code was undeniable.198 The amalgamation of decisional 
law and statutory enactments that comprised the state’s body of evidence 
law created an untenable framework for judges and practitioners.199 As one 
commentator lamented,  
[t]he rules governing the introduction of evidence often lie buried in 
the hundreds of volumes of North Carolina decisions . . . . Even 
when the judge or practitioner can leisurely search for the applicable 
rules, the hunt too often ends revealing no law on point or numerous 
precedents seemingly at war with themselves.200 
The General Assembly responded to the growing need for an 
accessible evidence code in 1979, directing the Legislative Research 
Commission to study the state’s evidence laws and propose a 
comprehensive code.201 Four years later, the Commission delivered its 
Report to the 1983 General Assembly.202 The Commission’s Evidence 
Laws Study Committee observed that the state’s evidence laws were 
“complex and confusing,” consisted of a “morass of cases and statutes,” 
and often resulted in “no clear answer” when consulted.203 Adopting a 
centralized code offered the opportunity to make the rules of evidence more 
accessible and easier to use for judges and trial lawyers alike.204 Most 
 
 198. As early as 1946, in the first edition of his treatise on North Carolina evidence, Dale 
Stansbury observed that the “law of Evidence is in need of considerable overhauling.” 
STANSBURY, supra note 143, at VIII. 
 199. See Walter J. Blakey, Moving Towards an Evidence Law of General Principles: Several 
Suggestions Concerning an Evidence Code for North Carolina, 13 N.C. CENT. L.J. 1, 5 (1981) 
(“The evidence law of North Carolina is a complex and confusing mixture of common law and 
narrow statutes.”). 
 200. Patrick, supra note 197, at 669–70 (discussing the need to reform North Carolina 
evidence law and calling for modified adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence). 
 201. H.R.J. Res. 65, 1979 Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (N.C. 1979). 
 202. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMM’N, EVIDENCE LAWS: REPORT TO THE 1983 GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA i (1982). The Commission’s Evidence Laws Study Committee 
initially met ten times, approving half of a proposed evidence code. Id. at ii. The Commission 
sought approval for further study, which the General Assembly approved in 1981. Id. The 
Evidence Laws Study Committee met eight additional times before approving a final, fully 
integrated evidence code for consideration to the General Assembly. Id. 
 203. Id. at iii. The Evidence Laws Study Committee found that evidence law in the state 
lacked clarity, often provided no answer to evidence questions, relied on slow-evolving decisional 
law, and failed to provide trial lawyers and judges with easily accessible guidance for arguing and 
ruling on evidence issues in the heat of trial. Id. 
 204. Id. (“The most compelling reason why North Carolina should codify the law of evidence 
is to make that law easier to find and use.”). 
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notably, however, it meant less reliance on a slow, evolving common law 
and would “serve as a vehicle for badly needed reform.”205 
The Evidence Laws Study Committee proposed that the General 
Assembly adopt an integrated code largely based on the recently enacted 
Federal Rules of Evidence.206 In crafting the proposed rules, the Committee 
took a logical approach by integrating the Federal Rules of Evidence with 
existing North Carolina evidence law. It concluded that “[a]n evidence 
code should retain the principles of North Carolina evidence law that are 
superior to the federal rules but not those that are outmoded.”207 
Regrettably, the Committee ultimately decided that the state’s broad 
approach to conviction-based impeachment was not “outmoded,” 
proposing minimal changes to impeachment with conviction evidence 
while largely leaving intact the practices that typified North Carolina 
common law.208 
C. North Carolina Rule 609 
Initially, the Evidence Laws Study Committee proposed 
comprehensive reform to the state’s widely permissive impeachment 
practices. In 1980, the Committee’s first draft of Rule 609(a) embraced a 
logical, refined approach by limiting convictions available for 
impeachment to crimes involving deceit, dishonesty, or false statement.209 
The original draft read as follows: 
(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a 
witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime is admissible 
if elicited from him or established by public record during cross-
examination or thereafter but only if the crime involved some element 
of deceit, untruthfulness, or falsification bearing upon the witness’s 
propensity to testify untruthfully, such as perjury or subordination of 
perjury, false statement, criminal fraud, embezzlement or false 
pretense or other crime in the nature of crimen falsi.210 
As proposed, the rule would have protected all witnesses, including 
victims, against broad forays into their criminal histories with crimes 
unrelated to dishonesty. Regrettably, the Committee’s initial proposal was 
discarded three years later for reasons not made known in the legislative 
 
 205. Id. (emphasis added). 
 206. Id. at iv–v. 
 207. Id. at vi. 
 208. See id. at 59–61. 
 209. Memorandum from Donald B. Hunt, Comm. Counsel, Leg. Res. Comm’n, to Evid. Law. 
Study Comm. 3 (May 6, 1982) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (detailing the 
original proposal for North Carolina Rule 609). 
 210. Id. (emphasis added). 
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history of the rule drafting.211 The final version submitted to the General 
Assembly encompassed a vast array of criminal convictions, echoing the 
state’s common law practice.212   
The 1983 General Assembly formally codified impeachment by prior 
conviction in North Carolina Rule of Evidence 609.213 The rule largely 
follows the structure of the federal rule but diverges significantly in the 
types of crimes available to impeach a witness. As originally adopted, 
North Carolina Rule 609(a) stated: 
(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a 
witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime punishable 
by more than 60 days confinement shall be admitted if elicited from 
him or established by public record during cross-examination or 
thereafter.214 
The final approach taken by the Evidence Laws Study Committee and 
later approved by the General Assembly echoed the common law approach 
to impeaching witnesses with most convictions. The rule did not limit 
convictions to crimes of dishonesty bearing directly on untruthfulness, such 
as those involving perjury, embezzlement, and fraud.215 It offered no 
rational correlation between the nature of the crime and untruthfulness 
whatsoever.216 And the rule placed only marginal limits on the severity of 
the crime by excluding convictions punishable by less than sixty days’ 
confinement.217 In fact, the rule linked conviction-based impeachment to 
the vast array of criminal convictions used as aggravating factors in 
sentencing rather than tying impeachment to crimes directly associated 
with dishonesty.218 The theory was purely punitive. A witness could be 
punished on the witness stand with a prior conviction that would later 
enhance punishment if convicted of a new crime.   
 
 211. The reasons for limiting impeachment to convictions based only on crimes of dishonesty 
and false statement are not indicated in the record. All that may be discerned is that the final, 
proposed rule rejected the original form in favor of broader conviction usage without reference to 
the nature or type of crime. 
 212. See LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMM’N, supra note 202, at 59–60. 
 213. An Act to Simplify and Codify the Rules of Evidence, ch. 701, § 1, 1983 N.C. Sess. 
Laws 666, 673 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1 (2017)). 
 214. Id. (emphasis added). 
 215. See id.; 1 KENNETH S. BROUN, BRANDIS & BROUN ON NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE 
§ 98, at 337–39 (7th ed. 2011). 
 216. State v. Carter, 326 N.C. 243, 250, 388 S.E.2d 111, 116 (1990) (concluding that, under 
North Carolina Rule 609(a), convictions for discrediting a witness are admissible without the 
crime having any “rational relevance to untruthfulness” (quoting 1 HENRY BRANDIS, JR., 
BRANDIS ON NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 112, at 484 (3d ed. 1988))). 
 217. N.C. R. EVID. 609(a) (1983). 
 218. See LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMM’N, supra note 202, at 60 (describing the standard in 
609(a) as “the standard used in the Fair Sentencing Act in defining an aggravating factor”).  
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D. Diverging from the Federal Rule 
North Carolina Rule 609(a) is significantly more permissive than its 
federal counterpart in both form and function.219 The federal rule narrows 
the range of convictions available for impeaching witnesses to felony-level 
crimes and those that involve dishonesty or false statement.220 
Impeachment is thereby restricted in scope to serious crimes that may 
generally suggest untruthful character and those crimes of any severity that 
directly correspond to untruthfulness.221 Like the common law before it, 
however, North Carolina Rule 609(a) offers no such distinctions. The rule 
is not tied to severe crimes, but instead incorporates a wide array of lesser 
misdemeanors as impeachment material.222 Moreover, the scope of low-
level misdemeanors is not narrowly tailored to those crimes involving 
deceit or falsity.223 
North Carolina Rule 609(a) is also less forgiving in function. As 
originally drafted and currently codified, the rule’s text affords no 
discretion for trial courts to guard against unfair prejudice to impeached 
witnesses, including victims.224 This textual absence represents a significant 
divergence from the federal rule.225 In federal trials, generic felony 
convictions that do not involve dishonest acts or false statements are not 
per se admissible to impeach a witness.226 Federal Rule 609(a) mandates 
that trial judges weigh the admissibility of a conviction not directly 
correlated to untruthfulness by balancing its probative value in revealing 
untruthful character against its prejudicial impact.227 Federal judges are 
 
 219. State v. Ross, 329 N.C. 108, 118, 405 S.E.2d 158, 164 (1991) (noting that the North 
Carolina rule is “more permissive than its federal counterpart”). 
 220. FED. R. EVID. 609(a). 
 221. Id. 
 222. N.C. R. EVID. 609(a); see discussion infra Part IV. 
 223. Id.; see discussion infra Part IV. 
 224. Compare N.C. R. EVID. 609(a) (1983) (Rule 609 as originally enacted), with N.C. R. 
EVID. 609(a) (2017). 
 225. See State v. Brown, 357 N.C. 382, 390, 584 S.E.2d 278, 283 (2003) (asserting that the 
text of Rule 609(a) affords “no room for the trial court’s discretion”). 
 226. FED. R. EVID. 609(a); State v. Ross, 329 N.C. 108, 118–19, 405 S.E.2d 158, 164 (1991) 
(observing that the federal rule requires the trial court to balance the probative value of the 
witness’s conviction against its prejudicial effect). 
 227. FED. R. EVID. 609(a). Under the federal approach, trial courts must weigh the 
conviction’s probative value in questioning credibility against the danger it may have in 
prejudicing the witness or case. Id. Where the prejudicial effect substantially outweighs the 
probative value in questioning credibility, the trial court has discretion to exclude the conviction. 
Id. This approach is markedly different from North Carolina Rule 609(a) which affords no direct 
textual discretion for trial courts to exclude convictions offered for impeachment purposes. N.C. 
R. EVID. 609(a). Certainly, North Carolina Rule 403 can and should be read in harmony with 
Rule 609(a) to give trial courts discretion to exclude convictions. See discussion infra Section 
II.F. 
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thereby empowered to shield witnesses from unfair attacks with generic 
felony convictions, including victims testifying as government witnesses.228 
The text of Federal Rule 609(a) also acknowledges the fundamental 
difference between impeaching a neutral witness and an accused person 
with prior-conviction evidence.229 The federal standard for impeaching 
testifying defendants with generic felony-level convictions is higher than 
all other witnesses given the danger that the jury will use the evidence to 
convict rather than to question the defendant’s veracity.230 North Carolina 
Rule 609(a) offers no similar protection to defendant-witnesses. Prior 
crimes that have identical attributes with the charged crime may be 
admitted against a testifying defendant,231 even though same-crime 
convictions carry the highest degree of prejudice and likelihood for juror 
misuse.232 
While other jurisdictions followed the federal approach to reining in 
conviction-based impeachment, North Carolina’s modifications were slight 
at best.233 The most significant alteration involved limiting the use of stale 
convictions.234 At common law, North Carolina courts refused to time-limit 
the age of a conviction—a conviction twenty-five years past was just as 
viable as a recent conviction for discrediting the witness.235 Mirroring the 
 
 228. FED. R. EVID. 609(a). 
 229. Id. at 609(a)(1)(A)–(B) (incorporating a higher standard for admitting felony-level 
convictions against a defendant-witness than the lesser standard employed for witnesses in civil 
cases and those other than the defendant in a criminal case). 
 230. See id. at 609(a) (permitting the trial court to exclude felony-level convictions that do not 
involve a dishonest act or false statement when offered to impeach a defendant-witness if the 
prejudicial effect even slightly outweighs the conviction’s probative value in questioning truthful 
testimony). 
 231. See, e.g., State v. Little, 163 N.C. App. 235, 242–43, 593 S.E.2d 113, 118 (2004) 
(finding proper impeachment of the defendant with a prior conviction for larceny in a case 
charging the defendant with first-degree burglary). 
 232. See, e.g., State v. Norris, 101 N.C. App. 144, 148, 398 S.E.2d 652, 654 (1990) (finding 
that the defendant’s prior conviction for incest was “so similar” to the current allegations for child 
rape that admitting it would have clearly prejudiced the defendant when applying the balancing 
factors in Rule 609(b)). 
 233. See WALTER JAMES BLAKEY, DEAN P. LOVEN & GLEN WEISSENBERGER, NORTH 
CAROLINA EVIDENCE, 2017 COURTROOM MANUAL 456 (2017) (describing Rule 609(a) as “only 
slightly more restrictive than the prior common law”); see also State v. Ross, 329 N.C. 108, 118, 
405 S.E.2d 158, 164 (1991) (“North Carolina’s version of Rule 609(a) is more permissive than its 
federal counterpart in that its only limitation on evidence of a witness’s convictions is that the 
crime be punishable by more than sixty days confinement.”). 
 234. N.C. R. EVID. 609(b). North Carolina Rule 609(c), (d) and (e) made modest changes to 
the use of convictions for pardoned crimes, juvenile convictions, and convictions on appeal. Id. at 
609(c)–(e). Because these provisions are beyond the scope of this Article, they are not addressed. 
 235. Laura E. Crumpler & Gordon Widenhouse, An Analysis of the New North Carolina 
Evidence Code: Opportunity for Reform, 20 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 53 n.378 (1984) 
(observing that no common law case suggests time restrictions on convictions used to impeach); 
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federal rule, North Carolina Rule 609(b) treats convictions more than ten 
years removed (from the later of the conviction date or release from 
confinement) as ostensibly inadmissible.236 Counsel offering a stale 
conviction for impeachment purposes must convince the trial court that 
admitting the conviction is in the interest of justice.237 In doing so, the 
proffering counsel is tasked with demonstrating that the conviction’s 
impeachment value is substantially more probative to untruthfulness than 
the prejudicial effect it would have against the witness.238 
E. North Carolina Rule 609(a) Revision and Regression 
The General Assembly amended Rule 609(a) in 1999 to clarify the 
types of convictions permissible for discrediting witness testimony.239 
Where the original standard was based on convictions “punishable by more 
than 60 days confinement,” the revised rule states the types of crimes, 
rather than the term of confinement.240 North Carolina Rule 609(a) now 
provides: 
 
see, e.g., State v. Jones, 63 N.C. App. 411, 421, 305 S.E.2d 221, 227 (1983) (admitting the 
defendant’s entire twenty-five year driving record showing traffic violations dating back to 1956). 
 236. N.C. R. EVID. 609(b); see State v. Brown, 357 N.C. 382, 390, 584 S.E.2d 278, 283 
(2003) (determining that a defendant’s 1986 conviction fell within the ambit of Rule 609(a), and 
not the more restrictive 609(b), because the defendant had not been released from confinement for 
the conviction until “1991 or 1992” and the defendant’s trial in 1998 placed the 1986 conviction 
“well within ten years from the date of defendant’s release from confinement”); Ross, 329 N.C. at 
119, 405 S.E.2d at 164 (noting that, unlike Rule 609(a), North Carolina Rule 609(b) “is identical 
to the federal rule” and therefore presumes that stale convictions are more prejudicial than 
probative of a witness’s “general character for truthfulness”). 
 237. N.C. R. EVID. 609(b). The reforms included in Rule 609(b) limiting the use of remote 
convictions were the most significant modification to the common law approach that placed no 
time restrictions on the conviction. Crumpler & Widenhouse, supra note 235, at 53 n.378 
(observing that no common law case suggests time restrictions on convictions used to impeach). 
Regrettably, as much as the rule speaks to the presumptive inadmissibility of stale convictions, 
modern North Carolina appellate courts continue to cling to tradition by repeatedly finding either 
no error or harmless error in trial court decisions to admit convictions well past the ten-year mark. 
See, e.g., Ross, 329 N.C. at 120–21, 405 S.E.2d at 165 (finding harmless error in the trial court’s 
admission of a fifteen-year-old conviction in Virginia for sodomy despite its prejudice and having 
zero relationship to untruthful character); State v. Joyner, 243 N.C. App. 644, 650, 777 S.E.2d 
332, 335–37 (2015) (finding no error in the trial court’s failure to make specific findings 
supporting the use of five stale convictions to impeach the defendant); State v. Hensley, 77 N.C. 
App. 192, 194–95, 334 S.E.2d 783, 784–85 (1985) (finding harmless error in the trial court’s 
decision to admit while failing to weigh the prejudice of the defendant’s thirteen-year-old 
conviction). 
 238. N.C. R. EVID. 609(b). 
 239. Act of May 21, 1999, ch. 79, sec. 1, § 8C-1, 1999 N.C. Sess. 114, 114 (codified as 
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1 (2017)) (amending the Evidence Code to make admissible 
for the purposes of impeachment evidence of a witness’s conviction of a felony or Class A1, 
Class 1, or Class 2 misdemeanor). 
 240. Id. 
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(a) General rule.—For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a 
witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a felony, or 
of a Class A1, Class 1, or Class 2 misdemeanor, shall be admitted if 
elicited from the witness or established by public record during 
cross-examination or thereafter.241 
Although perhaps not intentional, the 1999 revision effectively 
regressed conviction-based impeachment towards the wide-open 
impeachment practices of the pre-rules era given the state’s movement 
toward expanding crimes and increasing penalties. Today, Rule 609(a) 
makes the vast majority of North Carolina state crimes available for 
witness impeachment. The North Carolina Sentencing and Policy Advisory 
Commission currently identifies 2,206 unique crimes that may be admitted 
under Rule 609 given their classification.242 The Commission’s most recent 
summary of felony and misdemeanor offenses indicates that eighty-six 
percent of all crimes in North Carolina may be used to impeach 
witnesses.243 Only 349 total offenses are excluded.244 These low-level, 
Class 3 misdemeanors primarily consist of petty offenses like littering245 
and impermissible posting of advertisements.246 A total of 795 felonies and 
1,411 varying misdemeanors may currently be used to discredit a 
witness.247 These numbers will continue to increase if the trend of 
expanding crimes continues in North Carolina, as it has in recent years.248 
In the five-year period from 2008 to 2013, the General Assembly averaged 
an additional 16.8 new felonies and 17.5 new misdemeanors per year.249 
 
 241. N.C. R. EVID. 609(a) (emphasis added). 
 242. See N.C. SENTENCING & POL’Y ADVISORY COMM’N, FELONY CLASSIFICATION UNDER 
THE STRUCTURED SENTENCING ACT (2018), [hereinafter N.C. FELONY CLASSIFICATIONS], 
https://www.nccourts.gov/documents/publications/offense-classifications/felony-list-2018.pdf? 
CmxDfaPpOW5kONSYs4fxE2b34uYX8.23 [https://perma.cc/76CT-GLA4]; N.C. SENTENCING 
& POL’Y ADVISORY COMM’N, MISDEMEANOR CLASSIFICATION UNDER THE STRUCTURED 
SENTENCING ACT (2018), [hereinafter N.C. MISDEMEANOR CLASSIFICATIONS], 
https://www.nccourts.gov/documents/publications/offense-classifications/miademeanor-list-2018. 
pdf?FvP.iinNlu8aw.0UtReGkz.e185Shu4a [https://perma.cc/7BUS-9XN2]. 
 243. See N.C. FELONY CLASSIFICATIONS, supra note 242; N.C. MISDEMEANOR 
CLASSIFICATIONS, supra note 242.  
 244. See N.C. FELONY CLASSIFICATIONS, supra note 242; N.C. MISDEMEANOR 
CLASSIFICATIONS, supra note 242. 
 245. N.C. GEN STAT. § 14-399(c) (2017). 
 246. Id. § 14-145. 
 247. See N.C. FELONY CLASSIFICATIONS, supra note 242; N.C. MISDEMEANOR 
CLASSIFICATIONS, supra note 242. 
 248. See Welty, supra note 11, at 1939 (chronicling the precipitous rise in criminal statutes 
adopted by the North Carolina General Assembly and overcriminalization concerns in the state). 
Jeff Welty’s comprehensive review of the trend in statutory enactments is alarming. Between 
1986 and 2011 alone, the General Assembly increased the number of sections in Chapter 14, 
which contains North Carolina’s criminal code, by almost twenty-five percent. Id. at 1940. 
 249. Id. at 1942. 
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And many preexisting crimes have been reclassified to have a harsher 
punishment since Rule 609(a) was revised, suddenly making crimes that 
were previously unavailable for impeachment into cross-examination 
fodder.250 The correlative impact on witness impeachment cannot be 
ignored given that the standard used in Rule 609(a) ties admissible 
convictions to broad criminal categories. 
When amending the standard employed under Rule 609, the General 
Assembly compounded the negative impact of impeachment by prior 
conviction on witnesses and trial outcomes by opting not to correlate the 
type of conviction available to impeach a witness with crimes involving 
dishonesty.251 Today, felony convictions for impaired driving,252 beach 
bingo,253 and dog fighting254 are as admissible as embezzlement,255 
extortion,256 and perjury.257 Misdemeanor convictions for aggressive 
driving,258 failing to vaccinate a pet,259 fastening a boat to a bridge,260 and 
disorderly conduct261 stand alongside misdemeanor forgery,262 passing 
worthless checks,263 and blackmailing.264 The only basis for impeaching a 
 
 250. Id. at 1943. When Rule 609 was first adopted, commentators viewed it as making at least 
some modest reform to the otherwise limitless common law. INST. GOV’T, UNIV. N.C. CHAPEL 
HILL, NORTH CAROLINA LEGISLATION 1983: A SUMMARY OF LEGISLATION IN THE 1983 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF INTEREST TO NORTH CAROLINA PUBLIC OFFICIALS 67 (Ann L. Sawyer 
ed. 1983). At the time, the Institute of Government noted that simple assault could “not be used” 
to impeach a witness. Id. Today, simple assault is available to impeach a witness. N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 14-33(a) (2017); N.C. R. EVID. 609(a). 
 251. BROUN, supra note 215, § 98, at 337–38 (observing that, true to its common law 
antecedent, North Carolina Rule 609 “does not require that the crime have a rational relevance to 
untruthfulness”); Franklin Miller Williams, Note, The New North Carolina Rules of Evidence: 
Privileges, Relevancy, Competency, Impeachment, and Expert Opinion, 62 N.C. L. REV. 1290, 
1297 (1984) (concluding that Rule 609 can “be criticized for admitting evidence that may have no 
relation to the credibility of the witness”). 
 252. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-138.5(b) (2017) (classifying habitual impaired driving as a 
felony). 
 253. Id. § 14-309.14(2) (classifying beach bingo as a felony). 
 254. Id. § 14-362.2(a) (classifying dog fighting as a felony). 
 255. Id. § 14-90(b)(2) (classifying embezzlement as a felony). 
 256. Id. § 14-118.4 (classifying extortion as a felony). 
 257. Id. § 14-209 (classifying perjury as a felony); see also N.C. R. EVID. 609(a). 
 258. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-141.6(c) (2017) (classifying aggressive driving as a Class 1 
misdemeanor). 
 259. Id. §§ 130A-25(a), -185 (classifying failing to vaccinate a pet as a misdemeanor); see 
also N.C. MISDEMEANOR CLASSIFICATIONS, supra note 242, at 31. 
 260. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-80 (2017) (classifying fastening a boat to a bridge as a Class 1 
misdemeanor). 
 261. Id. § 14-288.4(c) (classifying disorderly conduct as a Class 2 misdemeanor). 
 262. N.C. MISDEMEANOR CLASSIFICATIONS, supra note 242, at 4 (classifying common law 
forgery as a Class 1 misdemeanor under the North Carolina Structured Sentencing Act). 
 263. N.C. GEN, STAT. § 14-107(d)(3) (2017) (classifying passing worthless checks as a Class 
1 misdemeanor). 
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witness with crimes clearly removed from false acts is the outmoded 
assumption that criminality of any kind corresponds to a dishonest 
character. In that sense, the current North Carolina Rule 609 perpetuates 
the same unsupported, ancient assumption that a witness’s prior 
convictions generally correlate to her subsequent untruthfulness, no matter 
the type or nature of the crime.265 
As detailed in the following parts, the General Assembly’s decision to 
adopt a broad classification standard for Rule 609 opens the door to lawyer 
abuse and juror misuse. Jurors are unlikely to view a witness’s prior 
conviction for disorderly conduct or aggressive driving as an indication that 
the witness is currently lying under oath. They are far more prone to view 
the witness as predisposed to antisocial behavior, regardless of the merits 
of her testimony or the case itself.266 
F. Judicial Recalcitrance to Reform 
Judicial recalcitrance to modern evidence rules aimed at preventing 
trial abuses has erased the initial hope for modest reform in impeachment 
practices. When the North Carolina Rules of Evidence were first enacted in 
1983, commentators expected greater flexibility for trial courts to manage 
the types of evidence presented to juries.267 They noted that the discretion 
mandated by the rules represented a marked improvement from the 
common law’s rigid commands.268 The North Carolina Institute of 
Government similarly described the rules as generally being “more liberal 
 
 264. Id. § 14-118 (classifying blackmail as a Class 1 misdemeanor); see also N.C. R. EVID. 
609(a). 
 265. By rejecting the common law’s broad approach to witness impeachment, Federal Rule 
609 would exclude some of the aforementioned crimes outright and would enable the trial court 
to exclude many of the others. As lesser crimes that do not require proving a dishonest act or false 
statement, the misdemeanor offenses for aggressive driving, failing to vaccinate a pet, fastening a 
boat to a bridge, and disorderly conduct would be wholly excluded for impeachment purposes. 
FED. R. EVID. 609(a). A federal judge would also have discretion to exclude the felony offenses 
having little probative value toward evaluating the witness’s character for dishonesty (e.g, beach 
bingo). Id. The only offenses that would be per se admissible under the federal rule would be the 
crimes of embezzlement, extortion, perjury, forgery, passing worthless checks, and blackmailing, 
given how they directly implicate dishonest character. See id. 
 266. Ladd, supra note 77, at 186; Sizemore, supra note 142, at 17 (observing that when 
“character evidence is paraded before the jury there is a natural inclination to reward a good man 
or to punish a bad man, regardless of the merits of the particular case”). 
 267. Crumpler & Widenhouse, supra note 235, at 2, 13 (anticipating that the then-newly-
enacted evidence code would “check the abuses involved in the interpretation and application of 
evidentiary principles” and that trial courts would have “the discretion needed to apply the rule[s] 
to each case as fairness and justice require”). 
 268. Id. at 53 n.378; Manning, supra note 195, at 37 (observing the “harshness” of North 
Carolina’s “all-inclusive” rule on impeachment with conviction evidence); Patrick, supra note 
197, at 673 (noting the difference between the approach to offering trial court discretion under the 
federal rules “[i]n contrast to the common law’s propensity to rely on rigid rules”). 
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than current law by granting greater discretion to the trial judges.”269 Trial 
judges were empowered to apply the rules “to each case as fairness and 
justice requires.”270 As a result, scholars anticipated that the former abuses 
encountered in cross-examination would be curtailed significantly given 
the broader discretion granted to trial judges to evaluate all forms of 
relevant evidence.271 This was especially true for convictions offered to 
impeach witnesses, which were among the most susceptible to abuse.272 
The judicial attitude toward the new rules, however, would prove 
commentators and scholars wrong on both fronts. 
Unquestionably, the overarching discretion afforded to trial courts 
under the newly enacted rules offered an opportunity for judicial 
intervention to prevent impeachment abuses.273 Most notably, the 
delegation of broad oversight to trial courts to exclude unfairly prejudicial 
evidence provided a clear avenue for judicial winnowing of conviction-
based impeachment.274 This authority was crystalized in North Carolina 
Rule of Evidence 403.275 The state’s adopted version of Rule 403 mirrors 
the federal rule, granting trial courts discretion to exclude relevant evidence 
that, on balance, creates too great a risk of unfair prejudice.276 Practitioners 
and scholars alike expected that the policy supporting Rule 403’s mandate 
would apply broadly to all types of relevant evidence.277 They noted that 
the rules of evidence were adopted as a single, comprehensive code278 and 
 
 269. INST. GOV’T, UNIV. N.C. CHAPEL HILL, supra note 250, at 66. 
 270. Crumpler & Widenhouse, supra note 235, at 13. 
 271. Id. at 23 (concluding that the limitations found in Rules 608 and 609 would 
“significantly alter the law in North Carolina” for impeaching witness credibility); Govert, supra 
note 160, at 540; Amanda F. Spence, Note, Evidence—Cross-Examination—Impeachment of 
Witnesses—State v. Williams, 330 N.C. 711, 412 S.E.2d 359 (1992), 71 N.C. L. REV. 2059, 2059 
(1993). 
 272. Crumpler & Widenhouse, supra note 235, at 47. 
 273. Id. at 52–53 (observing that if courts read the rules on conviction-based impeachment “in 
tandem with Rule 403” the cumulative effect would serve to reduce the “likelihood of undue 
prejudice in this area”). Trial court discretion is particularly appropriate for evaluating the 
propriety of discrediting witnesses with prior convictions for crimes unrelated to dishonest acts. 
See, e.g., Abshire v. Walls, 830 F.2d 1277, 1281 (4th Cir. 1987) (observing that minor crimes not 
involving dishonesty are worth “almost nil on the question of whether the jury should” believe the 
witness). 
 274. N.C. R. EVID. 403; see Crumpler & Widenhouse, supra note 235, at 13 (noting that Rule 
403 affords discretion for judges to evaluate the fairness of admitting each item of evidence 
proffered). 
 275. N.C. R. EVID. 403. 
 276. Compare N.C. R. EVID. 403 (permitting exclusion of evidence if the risk of unfair 
prejudice outweighs the probative value), with FED. R. EVID. 403 (same). 
 277. Crumpler & Widenhouse, supra note 235, at 15 (“Rule 403 erects a standard that every 
item of relevant evidence should meet.”); Patrick, supra note 197, at 673 (noting that Rule 403 
“expressly authorizes the trial judge to exercise discretion to exclude relevant evidence”). 
 278. Crumpler & Widenhouse, supra note 235, at 3 (observing that “[t]he rules were not 
adopted in isolation” but were designed to operate in tandem). 
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that Rule 403 served as a barrier over which all relevant evidence had to 
pass.279 Thus, if read in tandem, Rule 403 would serve as a discretionary 
check on the broad convictions generally deemed relevant to impeaching 
witness credibility under Rule 609(a).280 This logic was echoed at the time 
by federal courts interpreting Rule 403’s clear mandate as a “rule of 
exclusion that cuts across the rules of evidence.”281 Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina took the opposite approach, favoring the 
common law tradition of unimpeded impeachment without regard to the 
prejudicial impact or harm to the witness.282 
Since the passage of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence in 1983, 
the state’s judiciary has repeatedly declared itself powerless to exclude 
prior-conviction evidence that meets the requirements of 609(a) when 
offered for impeachment purposes.283 In State v. Brown,284 the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina rejected any basis for allowing trial court 
discretion to exclude convictions under Rule 609(a), no matter the 
prejudice to the witness, relevance to untruthful behavior, or likely impact 
on the jury’s decisionmaking.285 At trial, the defendant argued that his prior 
conviction so closely related to the charged offense that its admission 
 
 279. Id. at 15. 
 280. Id. at 26–27 (“Rule 403, with its independent requirement that probative value outweigh 
potential prejudice, should provide the extra measure of protection against some of the abuses 
inherent in the use of evidence of other crimes.”). 
 281. Jones v. Bd. of Police Comm’rs, 844 F.2d 500, 505 (8th Cir. 1988) (quoting Shows v. 
M/V Red Eagle, 695 F.2d 114, 118 (5th Cir. 1983)). Several federal appellate courts viewed Rule 
403 as a qualifier to Rule 609 where a specific standard was not included in the rule. See, e.g., 
Abshire v. Walls, 830 F.2d 1277, 1281 (4th Cir. 1987) (concluding that Rule 403 must be read in 
conjunction with Rule 609); Czajka v. Hickman, 703 F.2d 317, 319 (8th Cir. 1983) (“Rule 609 
does not foreclose the district court’s duty under Fed. R. Evid. 403 to weigh the probative value 
of the evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice.”). Others would view Rule 609 as 
controlling. See, e.g., Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 705–06 (7th Cir. 1987) (concluding that 
Rule 403 was not intended to supplant Rule 609); Diggs v. Lyons, 741 F.2d 577, 582 (3d Cir. 
1984) (concluding that the legislative history did not support federal Rule 403 modifying Rule 
609). Congress would amend Rule 609(a) in 1990 to clarify that Rule 403 applies to all witnesses 
other than the criminal defendant when evaluating the impeachment viability of convictions 
unrelated to dishonest acts and false statements. H.R. DOC. NO. 101-142, at 2 (1990). 
 282. See State v. Brown, 357 N.C. 382, 390, 584 S.E.2d 278, 283 (2003) (foreclosing Rule 
403’s application to conviction-based impeachment standards). 
 283. Id. (asserting that Rule 609(a) affords “no room for the trial court’s discretion”); State v. 
Perkins, 235 N.C. Ct. App. 425, 763 S.E.2d 928, 2014 WL 3824261, at *2 (2014) (unpublished 
table decision) (citing Brown in confirming the trial court’s decision to admit the defendant’s 
prior-conviction evidence if defendant elected to testify); State v. Lynch, 217 N.C. App. 455, 462, 
720 S.E.2d 452, 456 (2011) (granting a new trial after the trial court’s decision to exclude prior-
conviction evidence in violation of the “mandatory” language in Rule 609); Outlaw v. Johnson, 
190 N.C. App. 233, 247, 660 S.E.2d 550, 561 (2008) (finding error in the trial court’s decision to 
exclude convictions under Rule 403 under the controlling decision in Brown). 
 284. 357 N.C. 382, 584 S.E.2d 278 (2003). 
 285. Id. at 390, 584 S.E.2d at 283. 
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would be unfairly prejudicial.286 He urged the trial judge to exclude the 
conviction under Rule 403, arguing that the conviction’s low probative 
value for untruthfulness was substantially outweighed by its obvious 
prejudicial impact.287 The trial court denied the objection and admitted the 
conviction, refusing to employ Rule 403’s balancing test.288 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina endorsed the trial court’s 
decision, claiming the legislature foreclosed any basis for trial courts to 
exclude evidence otherwise admissible under Rule 609(a), notwithstanding 
the clear discretion afforded trial judges under Rule 403.289 The court 
maintained that the language within Rule 609(a) required “mandatory” 
admissibility of all convictions falling within its purview.290 According to 
Brown, the rule’s text left “no room for the trial court’s discretion.”291 The 
court maintained that, unlike the rule’s federal counterpart, North Carolina 
Rule 609(a) included no balancing test.292 This textual absence revealed to 
the court “an unequivocal intention to diverge from the federal requirement 
of a balancing test,” which embraced prejudicial impact, particularly to the 
defendant.293 As a consequence, trial court discretion to protect against 
unfair conviction-based impeachments was judicially nullified for all 
witnesses—civil or criminal, victim or accused—testifying in North 
Carolina courts. 
Today, the Brown decision stands firmly entrenched in North Carolina 
jurisprudence for the proposition that every conviction falling within the 
purview of Rule 609(a) must be admitted.294 The Supreme Court of North 
Carolina ignored its own precedent,295 scholarly admonitions,296 and the 
 
 286. Id. at 389, 584 S.E.2d at 282. The defendant argued that his prior conviction for 
“malicious wounding” would obviously create a danger of unfair prejudice given the murder 
allegations against him and that the conviction itself bore a remote connection to untruthfulness. 
Id. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. 
 289. See id. at 390, 584 S.E.2d at 283 (declaring that the defendant’s argument in favor of 
balancing convictions under Rule 403 failed to account for the “clearly expressed intent of the 
legislature”). 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. The hard line adopted by the Brown court failed to consider federal circuit decisions 
reading Federal Rule 609 in harmony with Federal Rule 403. Moreover, the court ignored the fact 
that the balancing provision found in Rule 609(b) represented a higher standard than that found in 
Rule 403. In that sense, it seems apparent that the reason Rule 609(a) includes no balancing 
provision is because it may be read in conjunction with Rule 403. 
 294. Id. (“The language of Rule 609(a) (‘shall be admitted’) is mandatory, leaving no room 
for the trial court’s discretion.” (emphasis added)). 
 295. See, e.g., State v. Blackwell, 276 N.C. 714, 724, 174 S.E.2d 534, 541 (1970) (“Whether 
the cross-examination goes too far or is unfair is a matter for determination of the trial judge and 
rests largely in his sole discretion.”); Ingle v. Roy Stone Transfer Corp., 271 N.C. 276, 282, 156 
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purpose of the rules themselves297 when concluding that trial courts have no 
discretion to exclude convictions with little probative value and a high 
degree of misuse. The General Assembly has made no effort to amend Rule 
609 in light of Brown’s mandate. Congress, within the same period, 
clarified the federal rule to confirm trial court discretion under Rule 403 for 
non-crimen falsi felonies.298 In 1999, Federal Rule 609 was amended to add 
a degree of protection to an entire class of witnesses, including victims.299 
North Carolina has not budged. Today, North Carolina trial courts are 
obliged to uphold Brown’s mandate: the thousands of convictions falling 
within Rule 609 must be admitted when offered by counsel, 
notwithstanding the unfair prejudice to the witness or impact on the jury’s 
decision. 
* * *  
The initial promise that a comprehensive evidence code would usher 
in systematic reform to the state’s impeachment practices has been 
dispelled. As drafted, and since interpreted, North Carolina Rule 609 
essentially embraces the same broad use of conviction evidence without 
regard to the accompanying prejudice, impact, or juror misuse. As a 
consequence, individuals subject to the force of open impeachment often 
elect not to subject themselves to the indignity imposed by the rule.300 
When applied to victims of domestic and sexual violence, dangerous 
defendants reap the benefits; when imposed on wrongly accused persons, 
jurors are tacitly permitted to circumvent affirmative proof of guilt. 
 
S.E.2d 265, 270 (1967) (demurring that “the judge is in charge of the trial” and “has plenary 
power to protect a witness from harassment and to keep cross-examination within the bounds of 
reason” after rejecting limits on conviction-based impeachment and berating other states’ statutes 
granting trial court discretion to exclude convictions); State v. King, 224 N.C. 329, 331, 30 
S.E.2d 230, 231–33 (1944) (recognizing fifty years before Brown that—even in a broad 
impeachment arena—some convictions simply afforded no value in weighing credibility and 
therefore should be excluded); State v. Neal, 222 N.C. 547, 547, 23 S.E.2d 911, 912 (1943) 
(“[W]hether the cross-examination goes too far or is unfair is a matter for determination of the 
trial judge, and rests largely in his sound discretion.” (emphasis added)); State v. Atkinson, 39 
N.C. App. 575, 580, 251 S.E.2d 677, 681 (1979). 
 296. Crumpler & Widenhouse, supra note 235, at 26–27 (“Rule 403, with its independent 
requirement that probative value outweigh potential prejudice, should provide the extra measure 
of protection against some of the abuses inherent in the use of evidence of other crimes.”). 
 297. N.C. R. EVID. 102(a) (“These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in 
administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and 
development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings 
justly determined.” (emphases added)). 
 298. See supra notes 121–25 and accompanying text. 
 299. See Amendments to Federal Rules of Evidence—Rule 609, 129 F.R.D. 347, 353–54 
(1990). 
 300. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 39, at § 609 app. 100; see infra Section III.C. 
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In the next part, this Article reveals the detrimental effect of North 
Carolina’s conviction-based impeachment practices by illustrating their 
impact on victims of sexual assault and domestic violence. Part III explores 
how the state’s adherence to rigid impeachment rules negatively affects 
juror decisionmaking, victim trauma, and victim-witness participation in 
the judicial system. Thereafter, Part IV proposes a straightforward 
amendment for reforming Rule 609 of the North Carolina Rules of 
Evidence to curb the harmful outcomes it currently produces. 
III.  ATTACKING VICTIMS: CHILLING TESTIMONY AND PROMOTING 
REVICTIMIZATION 
The victim of domestic or sexual violence invariably encounters a 
grueling experience when called to testify at trial. She must recount the 
horrors inflicted upon her––reliving the events as she tells them in vivid 
detail.301 During the process, she is expected to delve into deeply private 
concerns.302 Otherwise confidential information about her medical 
condition and psychological well-being are laid bare.303 Intimate details 
about her body are openly discussed.304 All of this occurs in a public forum 
before a jury comprised of complete strangers.305 
 
 301. H. Hunter Bruton, Cross-Examination, College Sexual-Assault Adjudications, and the 
Opportunity for Tuning Up the “Greatest Legal Engine Ever Invented,” 27 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 145, 177 (2017) (“At trial, the victim must undergo [the assault] trauma again when she 
recounts her experience in court.”); Mary Fan, Adversarial Justice’s Casualties: Defending 
Victim-Witness Protection, 55 B.C. L. REV. 775, 776 (2014) (“The evidence is mounting that 
undergoing rituals of adversarial adjudication retraumatizes victims of violent and sexual assault 
crimes.”); Jacqueline St. Joan, Sex, Sense, and Sensibility: Trespassing into the Culture of 
Domestic Abuse, 20 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 263, 282 (1997) (describing the difficulty, albeit 
critical importance, of domestic violence victims offering rich narratives to persuade judges and 
fact-finders). 
 302. Bruton, supra note 301, at 175 (“Testifying often entails a deep dive into private aspects 
of a witness’s life.”); St. Joan, supra note 301, at 298 (noting that trials are punctuated by the 
prosecution and defense as a “collection of [the victim’s] bodily functions that become available 
for public discourse”). 
 303. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 330 N.C. 711, 719, 723, 412 S.E.2d 359, 364, 367 (1992) 
(holding that the prosecution witness’s prior drug use, suicide attempts, and psychiatric history 
were “proper and admissible for purposes of impeachment” because North Carolina “has long 
allowed cross-examination regarding the witness’s past mental problems or defects”); Anoosha 
Rouhanian, A Call for Change: The Detrimental Impacts of Crawford v. Washington on Domestic 
Violence and Rape Prosecutions, 37 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 1, 34 (2017) (detailing the deterrent 
effect on victims testifying out of fear of personal records being exposed publicly at trial, 
including private counseling records used to cast doubt on the victim’s credibility). 
 304. Rouhanian, supra note 303, at 25 (noting the myriad reasons assault victims fail to 
testify at trial, including “being vulnerable to questioning on highly personal and sensitive 
topics”). 
 305. Ponce v. State, 901 S.W.2d 537, 541 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1995, no pet.) (noting the 
trauma imposed on the victim of sexual violence who is “forced to recount the entire ordeal for all 
and sundry in open court”). 
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The victim-witness must then endure the “crucible” of cross-
examination.306 Her testimony is given in the presence of the very person 
she alleges committed the violent acts––making the experience all the more 
daunting and traumatic.307 She often shoulders the burden as the primary 
witness in the prosecution’s case. Unlike other crimes where forensic 
evidence, video surveillance, and third-party witnesses abound, domestic 
abuse and sexual assaults routinely lack corroborating evidence.308 Most 
involve a single victim who has little more to offer than her own account.309 
Consequently, the victim-witness’s credibility often becomes the central 
focus of the trial.310 
Defense counsel frequently elect to “try the victim” when the 
government’s success or failure in convicting the assailant turns on the 
victim-witness’s credibility.311 When this tactic is employed, the focus of 
 
 306. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) (holding that the Sixth Amendment’s 
guarantee of confrontation “commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be 
assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination” (emphasis 
added)). 
 307. Id. (holding that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the procedural right to confront 
accusers through cross-examination); Fan, supra note 301, at 788 (“From just a simple lunge 
away, victims are required to testify and have their credibility judged, tested, and challenged on 
cross-examination.”). See generally Rouhanian, supra note 303, at 22–36 (detailing the 
deleterious effects of confrontation by cross-examination on victims of domestic and sexual 
violence). 
 308. Lisa Marie De Sanctis, Bridging the Gap Between the Rules of Evidence and Justice for 
Victims of Domestic Violence, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 359, 370–71 (1996) (observing that the 
prosecutorial problems unique to domestic violence cases include the lack of third-party 
witnesses and physical evidence because attacks tend to occur at home and victims often refuse or 
delay medical treatment); Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 
747, 771 (2005) [hereinafter Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers] (“The physical evidence in a 
domestic violence case is often scant, and it is susceptible to many different explanations.”). 
 309. Tom Lininger, The Sound of Silence: Holding Batterers Accountable for Silencing Their 
Victims, 87 TEX. L. REV. 857, 870 (2009) [hereinafter Lininger, Holding Batterers Accountable] 
(observing the difficulty prosecutors experience in proving domestic assault cases because the 
event typically involves only two witnesses). 
 310. People v. Griffin, 242 A.D.2d 70, 74 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (noting that where no other 
witnesses are available, “the credibility of the two people involved [is] the paramount issue for 
the jury to resolve”); Tom Lininger, Bearing the Cross, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1353, 1361 (2005) 
[hereinafter Lininger, Bearing the Cross] (“In most prosecutions of domestic violence or sexual 
assault, the key question is whether the jury believes the accuser’s or the defendant’s versions of 
the facts.”); Aviva Orenstein, No Bad Men!: A Feminist Analysis of Character Evidence in Rape 
Trials, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 663, 679–81 (1998); see St. Joan, supra note 301, at 304 (“The 
credibility factor is particularly crucial in cases involving domestic violence, because there are 
often no other witnesses.”). 
 311. Galloway v. State, 122 So. 3d 614, 668 (Miss. 2013) (upholding the trial court’s decision 
to prohibit defense counsel from revealing the victim’s sexual preferences as an improper attempt 
to inflame the jury into trying the victim rather than the accused); Lininger, Bearing the Cross, 
supra note 310, at 1378–79 (noting that the tactics employed by Kobe Bryant’s legal defense 
team in attacking the victim who alleged Bryant had raped her confirmed for men and defense 
attorneys that the “strategy of ‘trying the accuser’ pays big dividends in a rape prosecution”). 
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the trial shifts away from the violent event and onto the victim herself.312 
She is subjected to a barrage of questions about her sexual history, mental 
health, alcohol use, manner of dress, social interactions, and past crimes.313 
These forays are designed to discredit her by pandering to juror 
misconceptions about sexual assault and negative stereotypes concerning 
domestic violence.314 At the same time, they have the effect of harassing, 
embarrassing, and emotionally traumatizing the victim-witness.315 
The victim-witness’s trial experience is worsened further when cross-
examination confirms the victim’s fear that testifying will expose her to 
personal castigation.316 Those fears are realized when defense counsel 
elects to impeach her as a witness unworthy of belief.317 While rape-shield 
statutes protect some victims from character assaults,318 impeaching a 
victim-witness with her prior convictions remains a powerful weapon for 
 
 312. Bruton, supra note 301, at 174–78 (describing the strategy of turning trials into attacks 
on the victim by focusing on the victim’s past behavior under the auspices of consent); Lininger, 
Bearing the Cross, supra note 310, at 1355 (“In a ‘he said, she said’ contest, the defendant will 
naturally attempt to shift the focus from his own conduct to the foibles of the alleged victim.”).  
 313. Kennard v. State, 349 S.E.2d 470, 471 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) (finding that defense 
counsel’s evidence of the victim’s prior drug and alcohol treatment was correctly “excluded as 
irrelevant and as improperly tending to ‘blacken’ the victim’s character”); Orenstein, supra note 
310, at 680–82 (detailing the sexist belief that women are somehow blameworthy for being 
assaulted based on their behavior, reputation, and decisionmaking). 
 314. Wood v. State, 957 F.2d 1544, 1552–53 (9th Cir. 1992) (recognizing the likelihood that 
jurors may be influenced by notions of morality and proper conduct); Bruton, supra note 301, at 
177 (detailing how defense counsel utilize juror stereotypes and misconceptions about abuse in 
their efforts to achieve acquittals in sexual assault and domestic violence cases); Orenstein, supra 
note 310, at 681 (“Abundant evidence from psychology experiments indicates that various rape 
myths and other sexist stereotypes play a vital role in determining whether and how much the 
victim is held responsible.”). 
 315. See, e.g., Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 583 (6th Cir. 2018) (conceding that cross-
examination can have a harmful, harassing impact on the victim); Wood, 957 F.2d at 1552 (noting 
that sexual assault victims are disincentivized from reporting crimes against them out of fear of 
facing harassing questions and having their private lives made public at trial). 
 316. Lininger, Bearing the Cross, supra note 310, at 1357 (“As a general matter, victims’ 
willingness to report crimes varies inversely with their fear of embarrassment during cross-
examination.”). 
 317. Certainly, many criminal defense lawyers avoid harsh cross-examination tactics and are 
keenly aware of the danger that comes with unnecessarily attacking the victim. In North Carolina, 
the rule itself may force defense counsel’s hand where one’s client has a criminal history that will 
be used against him if he testifies. In that scenario, it is conceivable that defense counsel will 
impeach the victim with her prior convictions to equalize the impact such evidence may have at 
trial. 
 318. Fan, supra note 301, at 787 (noting that, although victim protection statutes safeguard 
some victims—primarily sexual but not domestic assault victims—from personal character 
assaults, they leave open other avenues for credibility attacks). Today, rape-shield statutes 
prohibit most of the insidious attacks formerly utilized to expose the victim’s personal sexual 
behavior. However, these statutes—including North Carolina’s own—are limited in nature and do 
not inhibit general attacks on the witness’s prior misdeeds. See N.C. R. EVID. 412. 
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attacking her personally.319 When this tactic is employed, the victim labors 
under the additional burden of having her criminal record turned against 
her. In these situations, the victim understandably feels that she, as opposed 
to the defendant, is on trial. 
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, victim-witnesses are largely 
shielded from defense counsel attacks with prior-conviction evidence. The 
types of crimes available for impeaching a witness’s general character for 
untruthfulness are limited.320 And the trial court is empowered to exclude 
those convictions with scant probative value but which risk unfairly 
marring the victim in the eyes of the jury.321 Victim-witnesses in North 
Carolina are afforded no similar protection. As this Article reveals, the 
state’s impeachment practices widely permit exposing a witness’s prior 
criminal misdeeds.322 Few crimes fall outside the credibility-attack ambit.323 
Trial courts lack any discretion to prevent general character attacks aimed 
at revealing prior criminal foibles.324 When the witness has no personal 
stake in the outcome, North Carolina’s impeachment policies may be 
humiliating, but not harmful. But when the witness is the victim, the state’s 
broad embrace of attacking witness credibility has far greater implications. 
As detailed below, North Carolina conviction-based impeachment 
practices impact negatively juror decisionmaking by perpetuating assault 
stereotypes, foster revictimization trauma on victim-witnesses, and impede 
societal interests in criminal accountability by depressing victim 
participation in the judicial system. 
A. Juror Influence: Promoting Harmful Stereotypes 
North Carolina’s broad approach to impeaching a witness’s credibility 
with prior-conviction evidence offers defense counsel an open avenue for 
pandering to juror stereotypes. Unlike most criminal cases, jurors may 
harbor a general distrust of victims who allege sexual assault and domestic 
 
 319. See, e.g., In re Ferguson, 487 P.2d 1234, 1240 (Cal. 1971) (in bank) (concluding that 
defense counsel’s need to attack the victim-witness’s credibility is heightened when the defendant 
claims innocence and the victim has prior convictions). 
 320. FED. R. EVID. 609(a) (limiting conviction-based impeachment to felonies and crimes 
involving an element of falsity while excluding all misdemeanors unrelated to truthfulness). 
 321. Id. For non-defendant-witnesses such as victims, trial courts are empowered to exercise 
their broad discretion granted under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 to protect victim-witnesses 
against character attacks with criminal convictions that have little probative value when weighed 
against the danger they will unfairly prejudice the witness or trial. Id.; FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 322. See supra Section II.C. 
 323. See supra Section II.E. (noting over two thousand crimes, including the vast majority of 
misdemeanors, available to impeach North Carolina witnesses). 
 324. See supra Section II.D. 
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violence.325 This distrust often derives from long-standing myths 
surrounding domestic abuse and sexual assault. Many jurors adhere to 
domestic violence myths that family violence is rare or somehow invited by 
the victim’s actions.326 Some conform to antiquated notions that domestic 
violence is a personal, family matter that should remain private.327 Cultural 
myths surrounding sexual assault continue to plague prosecution of these 
offenses as well.328 Jurors prefer to believe rape rarely occurs.329 They 
incorrectly assume sexual assault is “wildly aberrational,” only happening 
at the hands of a stranger who violently attacks an unknown victim who 
placed herself in the wrong place at the wrong time.330 They therefore tend 
to focus primarily on the victim and her actions, especially when sexual 
assault is perpetrated by an acquaintance.331 Where the victim is less than 
the ideal image jurors associate with an “innocent” victim, jurors may be 
less likely to believe the victim is a victim at all.332 
Professor Aviva Orenstein, a noted social justice scholar, aptly 
describes the cultural rape myth: 
[A] heroine—young, attractive, respectable—who has been brutally 
attacked and raped despite fierce resistance. At the time of the rape, 
she is modestly dressed and where she is supposed to be. She has no 
promiscuous past or lascivious inclinations. Thus, she has also done 
nothing, be it seductive or incautious to “invite” the violent attack. 
She reports this violation immediately. The anti-hero of this fable is 
 
 325. Lininger, Bearing the Cross, supra note 310, at 1360 (observing that some jurors and 
judges simply believe victims “fabricate” sexual assault claims); Rouhanian, supra note 303, at 
36 (“There is a national, ‘widespread perception’ amongst the public that rape victims lie about 
their assaults.”); Christina M. Tchen, Rape Reform and a Statutory Consent Defense, 74 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1518, 1520–22 (1983) (detailing the extensive history of the legal system’s 
distrust of rape complainants). 
 326. De Sanctis, supra note 308, at 372–73 (observing that jurors may prefer believing that 
domestic abuse is rare or subscribe to domestic violence myths including, “she likes the abuse, it 
is her own fault for not leaving, she shouldn’t be airing her personal problems in public, etc.”). 
 327. Lininger, Bearing the Cross, supra note 310, at 1360 (“Some jurors and judges believe 
that domestic violence is a natural occurrence in families . . . .”). 
 328. Id. at 1360; Orenstein, supra note 310, at 677–78; Rouhanian, supra note 303, at 37–39. 
 329. See De Sanctis, supra note 308, at 371–72 (explaining that juror “belief in a just world” 
predisposes jurors to think the assault did not occur or was the result of the victim’s own actions); 
Orenstein, supra note 310, at 676 (describing the common view of rape as “exceptional or 
unusual” as a form of cultural denial). 
 330. Orenstein, supra note 310, at 676. 
 331. Id. at 679–80 (noting that distrust of rape victims leads jurors to focus on victims’ 
motives and mores). 
 332. Lininger, Bearing the Cross, supra note 310, at 1360 (explaining that “sexist 
stereotypes” dominate judge and juror assumptions about whether domestic violence or sexual 
assault occurred or, worse, whether it was invited); Orenstein, supra note 310, at 682 (explaining 
the “rape myth” and how deviation from juror expectations of rape, victim response, and victim 
behavior “may prompt juries to believe that no rape occurred or that the incident was the victim’s 
fault”). 
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the brutish male aggressor. He is a sex-crazed, deviant sociopath. He 
has no previous acquaintance with the victim. He is violent and 
sadistic, using extreme force to violate his victim. He is a “loser” 
who has no girlfriend.333 
The perpetual myths surrounding domestic violence and sexual assault 
play a significant role in juror stereotypes of victim and aggressor 
behavior.334 Jurors are more likely to cast blame on a woman who engages 
in behavior they believe somehow helped facilitate the assault.335 Survivors 
are scrutinized for their actions––how much they had to drink, what they 
wore, how they acted, who they were with, what they said, etc.336 When a 
victim deviates from juror prototypes of the “innocent” victim, jurors 
become less inclined to convict.337 As a result, the law rewards defense 
counsel efforts to portray the victim in a negative light as it permits attacks 
on the victim’s character through evidence of prior convictions, especially 
for crimes that jurors may view as immoral or risky.338 
Consider the following hypothetical modeled on recent campus sexual 
assault cases from California,339 Ohio,340 and Texas341: 
A twenty-year-old college student attends a fraternity party. Despite 
being under the legal drinking age, she is served alcohol in fruit 
punch drinks. As the evening progresses, one of the fraternity 
members approaches and begins talking to her. She is later seen 
leaving his room in the predawn hours the following morning. A ride 
service drops her off at the hospital. She tells the intake nurse she 
 
 333. Orenstein, supra note 310, at 677–78. 
 334. Id. at 678–84 (“The traditional image of a rapist as a ‘knife wielding maniac unknown to 
his attacker’ is simply false.”). 
 335. De Sanctis, supra note 308, at 372–73; Orenstein, supra note 310, at 684–86. 
 336. Bruton, supra note 301, at 176–77. 
 337. See Orenstein, supra note 310, at 684–86 (describing the rape paradigm and its negative 
impact on police, prosecutors, and jurors who simply fail to believe the victim when she does not 
conform to the paradigm’s constructs). 
 338. See generally Bruton, supra note 301, at 176–78 (describing defense counsel attempts to 
exculpate defendants by pandering to juror stereotypes about victim behavior); Orenstein, supra 
note 310, at 685–86 (detailing defense counsel attacks on victims’ “so-called contributory 
negligence and other non-traditional behaviors”). Prostitution, public indecency, and other 
morality-based crimes may pander to juror expectations of moral decency and invite antiquated 
assumptions about victim behavior bearing on consent. 
 339. People v. Turner, No. H043709, 2018 WL 3751731, at *1–3 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug 8, 
2018); Liam Stack, Light Sentence for Brock Turner in Stanford Rape Case Draws Outrage, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/07/us/outrage-in-stanford-rape-case-
over-dueling-statements-of-victim-and-attackers-father.html [https://perma.cc/55U4-J8VB (dark 
archive)]. 
 340. Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 578–80 (6th Cir. 2018). 
 341. No Jail Time for Ex-Baylor Fraternity President Accused of Rape, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 11, 
2018), https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-baylor-frat-rape-accusation-20181211-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/EB8W-4JXD]. 
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has been sexually assaulted. Medical providers perform a rape test 
to collect DNA. She later tells investigators about the night prior. 
She recalls being given several drinks at the party. She says the last 
drink she was given caused her to become disoriented and ill. A male 
individual she met earlier led her through the fraternity house to his 
room, telling her she could rest until she felt better. Once inside, he 
sexually assaulted her—taking advantage of her incapacitated state. 
Forensic analysis confirms that the DNA taken from the victim 
matches the fraternity member. The defendant readily admits to the 
sexual encounter. He simply says it was consensual. He claims the 
victim asked him to take her to his room and, although she was 
intoxicated, fully consented to the sexual encounter. Nobody else was 
present at the time. Witnesses at the party indicate the victim had 
been drinking and recall the defendant offering her a place to sleep 
for the night. Some indicate the victim was in no condition to make 
informed decisions and was saying she needed to lie down. 
Prosecutors bring sexual assault charges against the fraternity 
member based on the victim’s allegations, DNA evidence, and 
witness accounts. The case proceeds to trial. 
Let us pause at this juncture. The case is antithetical to the traditional 
sexual assault myth most jurors likely accept about “stranger” rapists. The 
assailant is not a violent sociopath using extreme force on an unknown 
victim. This example does, though, represent the most common form of 
sexual assault. In the majority of cases, the victim is acquainted with her 
assailant.342 Thus, from the outset, prosecutors will have to educate 
prospective jurors about rape realities during jury selection.343 At trial, they 
may need to call an expert witness to deconstruct the rape myth for jurors 
while explaining how sexual assault occurs in our society predominately at 
the hands of acquaintances and intimate partners.344 
The facts present another impediment to prosecution germane to this 
analysis. Because people prefer to assume they live in a world where sexual 
violence does not occur, jurors are predisposed to scrutinizing the victim 
when her behavior falls outside of the “innocent” victim model jurors 
 
 342. Sexual Assault in the United States, NAT’L SEXUAL VIOLENCE RESOURCE CTR., 
www.nsvrc.org/statistics [https://perma.cc/P7GE-XXVP] (indicating that 51.1% of female 
victims of rape reported being raped by an intimate partner and 40.8% by an acquaintance). 
 343. Christopher Mallios & Toolsi Meisner, Educating Juries in Sexual Assault Cases Part I: 
Using Voir Dire to Eliminate Jury Bias, STRATEGIES 2–6 (July 2012), 
http://www.ncdsv.org/images/AEquitas_EducatingJuriesInSexualAssaultCasesPart1_7-2010.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/68LJ-TYSL]. 
 344. Orenstein, supra note 310, at 701–11 (discussing the use of experts to educate juries on 
rape trauma syndrome and the domestic violence paradigm). 
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expect.345 The more jurors perceive that the victim engaged in risk-taking 
behavior, the more likely they are to assign blame to the victim by applying 
“assumption-of-the-risk” logic.346 
Capitalizing on juror aversion to victims who engage in risk-taking 
activities, such as drug or alcohol use, one can imagine defense counsel’s 
cross-examination proceeding in part as follows: 
Q: You went to the fraternity party? 
A: I did. 
Q: You had an alcoholic drink? 
A: Someone gave me a drink. 
Q: You took it, right? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Even though you were under twenty-one years old? 
A: They were handing them out. 
Q: Is that a “yes?” 
A: Yes . . . 
Q: And then you had another drink? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And then another? 
A: Umm, yeah . . .347 
Victim cross-examination often focuses on the victim’s actions 
preceding the assault to elicit questions about the victim’s memory, 
mannerisms, and behavior.348 All of these are aimed at attacking her 
 
 345. De Sanctis, supra note 308, at 371–72. 
 346. Orenstein, supra note 310, at 685–86 (describing permissible attacks on victims not 
excluded by rape shield statutes that pander to juror stereotypes that the victim somehow 
contributed to her attack by her risk-taking); Cassia Spohn & David Holleran, Prosecuting Sexual 
Assault: A Comparison of Charging Decisions in Sexual Assault Cases Involving Strangers, 
Acquaintances, and Intimate Partners, 18 JUST. Q. 652, 672–73 (2001) (analyzing empirical data 
to conclude that victim risk-taking and reputation play a significant role in prosecutor decisions to 
charge based on their expectations of success at trial). 
 347. See generally Eleanor W. Myers & Edward D. Ohlbaum, Discrediting the Truthful 
Witness: Demonstrating the Reality of Adversary Advocacy, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1055, 1060 
(2000) (demonstrating the impact of cross-examining the “truthful” assault victim with evidence 
of victim behavior occurring prior to the assault). 
 348. Sara D. Schotland, Rape Victims as Mockingbirds: A Law and Linguistics Analysis of 
Cross-Examination of Rape Complainants, 19 BUFF. J. GENDER, L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 25 (2011) 
(“Inevitably, cross-examinations in rape cases paint the rape complainant as someone who is lax 
in her dating behavior, loose in her morals, or otherwise ‘wanted it.’” (quoting GREGORY M. 
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credibility and raising the question of whether the victim consented to the 
sexual encounter as alleged by the defendant.349 In these situations, the 
victim-witness is subject to attack on the very stereotypes that jurors likely 
possess: sexual assault happens in one way and victims are “responsible” 
for their own risky choices. 
Let us now move our hypothetical case into a North Carolina state 
superior court and consider the exacerbating effect criminal-conviction 
evidence has on exploiting juror stereotypes about sexual assault and 
victim behavior: 
Knowing the victim must testify, defense counsel begins preparing 
for cross-examination. Private investigators have revealed the 
victim’s past run-ins with the law. Her indiscretions appear useful to 
the defense as it builds the case against her: a Class 2 misdemeanor 
for possession of alcohol as an eighteen-year-old350 in high school 
followed by a Class 2 misdemeanor disorderly conduct offense351 
after a concert the summer before college. During her freshman 
year, a resident assistant discovered drug paraphernalia in her dorm 
room, resulting in another Class 1 misdemeanor.352 
Armed with the victim’s criminal record, defense counsel begins 
crafting cross-examination. Counsel intends to discredit her by 
revealing to the jury all of her prior encounters with the law. The 
stated purpose will be to question her character for truthfulness. 
Subtly, however, counsel plans on using these indiscretions to 
suggest she has a character for “wild, reckless behavior” and is a 
“party girl” who consented to the sexual encounter with the 
defendant the night of the fraternity party. 
The Federal Rules of Evidence and jurisdictions hewing closely 
thereto would proscribe the cross-examination contemplated in this 
hypothetical case353 and force defense counsel to pursue another line of 
questioning. The convictions are not felonies, nor are they misdemeanors 
 
MATOESIAN, REPRODUCING RAPE: DOMINATION THROUGH TALK IN THE COURTROOM 222 
(William M. O’Barr & John M. Conley eds., 1993))). 
 349. David Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client Relationship: 
A Reply to Stephen Ellmann, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1004, 1028 (1990) (“To make it seem plausible 
that the victim consented and then turned around and charged rape, the lawyer must play to the 
jurors’ deeply rooted cultural fantasies about feminine sexual voracity and vengefulness.”); 
Schotland, supra note 348, at 25. 
 350. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-302(b)(1) (2017). 
 351. See id. § 14-288.4. 
 352. See id. § 90-113.22(a). 
 353. FED. R. EVID. 609(a) (strictly limiting conviction-based impeachment to felonies and 
crimes involving an element of falsity while excluding all misdemeanors unrelated to 
truthfulness). 
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that require proving dishonesty or false statement as an element.354 None 
remotely correlates to untruthfulness.355 
The convictions are not, however, divorced from what jurors may 
perceive as risk-taking activities demonstrating poor judgment or, worse, 
immoral behavior.356 And that is the very sentiment defense counsel seeks 
to exploit.357 Directly attacking the victim-witness as a “party girl” or a 
person with a “wild, reckless character” through evidence of prior acts of 
drinking, disorderly conduct, or drug use is off limits, even in North 
Carolina.358 Indirectly, however, defense counsel is afforded a clear path to 
circumvent prohibitions on character assaults given the mandatory 
admission of her convictions under North Carolina Rule 609(a).359 When 
the victim’s criminal history aligns with risk-taking activities, defense 
counsel can openly impugn the victim’s moral character under the auspices 
of attacking her credibility. 
North Carolina’s permissive approach to conviction-based 
impeachment tacitly encourages exploiting juror beliefs about victim 
behavior and perpetuates insidious cultural stereotypes about domestic 
violence and sexual assault. Where a victim’s criminal convictions 
correlate to immoral or risky behavior, jurors are more likely to succumb to 
false myths. At the same time, juror focus is directed away from the 
defendant’s guilt or innocence and onto the victim herself. 
This deleterious effect on juror decisionmaking alone is sufficient 
cause for reforming North Carolina Rule 609(a). It is not, however, the sole 
reason. 
 
 354. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-288.4, 18B-302(b)(1), 90-113.22(a) (2017). 
 355. See, e.g., State v. Pickens, No. W2015-00368-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 9581393, at *4–5 
(Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 29, 2015) (concluding that the sexual assault victim’s prior convictions in 
North Carolina for possession of cocaine and marijuana were not felonies nor crimes of 
dishonesty and were therefore properly excluded by the trial court). 
 356. Wood v. Alaska, 957 F.2d 1544, 1552–53 (9th Cir. 1992) (observing that jurors are 
influenced by moral constructs that negatively impact their decisionmaking if the victim’s 
behavior does not conform thereto); Bruton, supra note 301, at 176–77; Orenstein, supra note 
310, at 683–84 (discussing juror feelings about victim behavior and their sense that the victim 
may have “invited” the assault by her actions). 
 357. Bruton, supra note 301, at 175 (observing that “creative cross-examiners can devise 
subtle subterfuge to elicit the same information [about impermissible topics] or make the same 
insinuations through permissible questioning”). 
 358. See, e.g., N.C. R. EVID. 404 (excluding prior acts of a person to prove his or her 
character, including victim traits not pertinent to the case issues); Dunton v. State, 453 S.E.2d 
800, 801 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (“[W]hether the victim used drugs in the past or was generally 
knowledgeable about illegal drugs is irrelevant to the issue of whether [the defendant] committed 
the offenses of rape and kidnapping. Rape is no more lawful when committed against a woman 
who uses cocaine than it is against one who does not use cocaine.”). 
 359. State v. Brown, 357 N.C. 382, 390, 584 S.E.2d 278, 283 (2003) (holding that Rule 
609(a) affords “no room for the trial court’s discretion”). 
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B. Victim Trauma: Enhancing Revictimization 
North Carolina’s permissive approach to impeaching witnesses with 
prior-conviction evidence also enhances the revictimization effect 
experienced by victim-witnesses. Revictimization is an accepted byproduct 
of the adversarial system for assault victims who brave testifying.360 The 
victim suffers at least two and, depending on the cross-examination tactics 
employed, potentially three traumatic events.361 First, the victim suffers the 
trauma of the assault and the resultant physical and psychological 
injuries.362 If she reports the attack, she next endures the ordeal of evidence 
collection, investigative inquiry, and public disclosure.363 Finally, if she 
proceeds with assisting the prosecution, she must confront her alleged 
assailant and succumb to a cross-examination often aimed at discrediting 
her story by attacking her character.364 
Cross-examination is confrontational by design. The American justice 
system reveres face-to-face confrontation through cross-examination as 
indispensable to truth-finding.365 The adversarial process therefore 
condones aggressive cross-examination of witnesses as part and parcel of 
the trial system.366 Understandably, given the due process rights of the 
defendant and the life and liberty interests at stake, victim-witnesses are 
equally as subject to the rigors of cross-examination as any other witness. 
The impact, however, is dissimilar. The neighbor who sees a domestic 
assault through her window and later recounts what she witnessed in court 
is subject to cross-examination. The same is true for the woman who 
survived the attack. The personal impact of cross-examination on these 
witnesses, however, is profoundly disparate. The neighbor is not 
susceptible to revictimization. She has not been victimized in the first 
instance. 
 
 360. Bruton, supra note 301, at 178 (describing the victim trial experience and observing that 
“[e]ven when a favorable outcome occurs, the trauma inflicted by the trial can contribute to 
lasting psychological injury”); see also Fan, supra note 301, at 783–92 (explaining how the 
adversarial criminal justice process worsens post-traumatic stress and causes victims pain); 
Lininger, Bearing the Cross, supra note 310, at 1359–60; Rouhanian, supra note 303, at 43–44. 
 361. Bruton, supra note 301, at 176–77; Schotland, supra note 348, at 25. 
 362. Bruton, supra note 301, at 176–77; Orenstein, supra note 310, at 674. 
 363. Myka Held, A Constitutional Remedy for Sexual Assault Survivors, 16 GEO. J. GENDER 
& L. 445, 447–52 (2015) (detailing revictimization at the hands of investigators and prosecutors 
entrenched in cultural rape myths and victim stereotyping); Orenstein, supra note 310, at 682 
(noting that when a victim reports an assault she is “measured by everyone” including “friends, 
police, prosecutors, and . . . jurors”). 
 364. Fan, supra note 301, at 790–92; see Lininger, Bearing the Cross, supra note 310, at 
1359–60; Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers, supra note 308, at 772. 
 365. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61–62 (2004) (proclaiming that adversarial 
testing through cross-examination “beats and bolts out the Truth much better” (quoting 
MATTHEW HALE, HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 258 (1713))). 
 366. Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers, supra note 308, at 772. 
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The assault victim absorbs the impact of cross-examination 
personally, even under the best of circumstances.367 Where cross-
examination questions are directed toward exposing the witness’s faulty 
perception, biases, and motivations, they are permissible, albeit 
traumatic.368 The victim must relive the events as told through the narrow 
constructs the cross-examiner seeks to reveal.369 For example, defense 
counsel commonly use variances in her account to suggest she cannot be 
trusted.370 To the victim, this can feel like her story is being twisted or 
inconsistencies exaggerated, elevating her sense of self-blame.371 When 
cross-examination questions veer away from her story and into her 
lifestyle, the victim’s trial trauma elevates.372 She encounters a personal 
assault as questions chip away at her behavior, manner of dress, 
decisionmaking, speech, memory, and other individual concerns.373 
Revictimization trauma is inevitable at this point. Regrettably, for a North 
Carolina victim with a prior criminal record, revictimization trauma is not 
yet complete. 
In our prior hypothetical, we analyzed a college sexual assault case by 
contemplating the negative effect the victim’s criminal record may have on 
jurors. We did not then examine the impact on the victim-witness herself. It 
cannot be ignored. Let us now consider how revictimization trauma 
escalates when prior crimes are used as additional cross-examination 
fodder to attack the victim’s credibility. 
Exposing the victim’s past crimes to impugn her credibility, defense 
counsel’s cross-examination continues as follows: 
Q: This isn’t your first time in the court system is it? 
A: Excuse me? 
Q: You have had trouble following the law, haven’t you? 
A: I don’t think that’s fair, no. 
 
 367. Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 583 (6th Cir. 2018) (observing that cross-examination can 
have a harmful, harassing impact on the victim). 
 368. See Orenstein, supra note 310, at 679. 
 369. Bruton, supra note 301, at 164 (“Many advocates use cross-examination more to trap 
witnesses than to add information.”). 
 370. Id. at 165 (observing how cross-examination can mislead the victim-witness into 
changing her truthful story); De Sanctis, supra note 308, at 373 (“Jurors may assume a ‘real’ 
victim would remember the details of her abuse, and may interpret a partial memory as evidence 
that the victim is lying.”). 
 371. See generally Fan, supra note 301, at 785–86, 788–90 (detailing the circumstances under 
which victims are retraumatized and experience PTSD triggers during the adversarial process). 
 372. Id.; Schotland, supra note 348, at 28. 
 373. Lininger, Bearing the Cross, supra note 310, at 1361 (describing such questions as 
“tantamount to public psychoanalysis”); Orenstein, supra note 310, at 681–82 (describing blame 
tactics employed through personal attacks on the victim). 
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Q: You received your first misdemeanor in high school? 
A: I got caught with a beer. I wasn’t the only one. 
Q: Is that a “yes” to my question? 
A: Yes . . . 
Q: You later received a second misdemeanor? 
A: Yes. 
Q: The summer before enrolling in college? 
A: Yes. 
Q: That was for disorderly conduct? 
A: Yes. 
Q: After attending a concert? 
A: Yes, it was stupid . . . 
Q: Your first year in college you were guilty of another? 
A: I made a dumb mistake. 
Q: My question is whether you received a third conviction? 
A: Yes. 
Q: This time for drug paraphernalia? 
A: Yes . . . 
As the victim experiences a cross-examination bent on discrediting 
her with her criminal past, revictimization trauma is inevitable. Do the 
victim’s underage alcohol possession, disorderly conduct, or drug 
paraphernalia misdemeanors correspond to her lying about being sexually 
assaulted? Not unless one continues to accept Justice Holmes’s 
unsubstantiated claim that a person who commits any crime is prepared to 
commit further “evil” by lying on the witness stand.374 None of these 
crimes remotely corresponds to witness untruthfulness. Their primary value 
is to dehumanize rather than discredit the victim-witness. Whether 
intentional or not, attacking the victim with innocuous convictions 
embarrasses and demeans her personally. And yet North Carolina 
impeachment practice openly condones it. 
 
 374. See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text. 
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The corresponding result is a defendant who may reap the windfall of 
revictimizing the victim-witness.375 It is a simple reality of the system the 
state has adopted. Defendants and defense counsel alike increasingly 
recognize the dilemma for the victim.376 If she testifies against her assailant, 
he will have the opportunity to confront her through his attorney or 
personally if he elects self-representation.377 The prospect of confrontation 
alone may cause her to withdraw from prosecution. If not, revictimization 
tactics—like those encouraged by broad impeachment practices—may play 
out in the defendant’s favor. If she responds angrily to questions aimed at 
assailing her character, jurors may be less sympathetic to her.378 If she 
retreats into herself, jurors may view her as less credible.379 However the 
jury is influenced, the corollary effect is to further traumatize the victim. 
North Carolina Rule 609 promotes systemic revictimization by 
permitting victim impeachment with an array of crimes that assails her 
personal, rather than truthful, character. The state’s courts then implicitly 
accept revictimization as a byproduct of impeachment by denouncing 
discretion to exclude crimes falling within the rule’s wide net.380 
Paradoxically, North Carolina Rule 609 is based on the dubious theory that 
a crime that enhances punishment also impugns credibility.381 Yet when 
employed against victim-witnesses, the rule itself punishes them through 
senseless revictimization. For the victim, suffering violence at the hands of 
her attacker is the first injury. Publicly recounting her attack is a second. 
Being castigated as a liar with her prior criminal record is one more trauma 
needlessly imposed on the survivor by the justice system. 
C. Societal Harm: Deterring Victim Participation 
North Carolina Rule 609 perverts justice further by chilling victim-
witness participation in the very system it means to protect. 
Understandably, public embarrassment ranks among the primary fears 
 
 375. Fan, supra note 301, at 788–91 (observing that some defense counsel use confrontation 
to intentionally revictimize victims and that prosecutors may dismiss or offer pleas to lesser 
charges to protect victims from additional trauma imposed by heavy-handed cross-examination 
tactics). 
 376. Lininger, Bearing the Cross, supra note 310, at 1366. 
 377. Id. at 1360 (“Some accusers may perceive cross-examination by the defense as yet 
another attack by the defendant (through the proxy of defense counsel).”). 
 378. De Sanctis, supra note 308, at 373; Luban, supra note 349, at 1028 (noting that when 
defense counsel pursues questioning that humiliates the victim she may “blow[] up” or retreat 
inside herself emotionally and, in doing either, lose credibility as a victim). 
 379. DeSanctis, supra note 308, at 373; Luban, supra note 349, at 1028. 
 380. See supra notes 282–299 and accompanying text. 
 381. See supra Section II.C. 
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victims express about cooperating in the prosecution of their assailants.382 
Those fears are confirmed when evidence rules encourage attacking the 
victim with her prior convictions. North Carolina Rule 609 effectively tells 
victim-witnesses with criminal pasts they can expect to be humiliated with 
their criminal record.383 As a consequence, victim-witnesses who possess 
criminal records may retreat from prosecution altogether rather than endure 
public degradation.384 When they do, the very purpose of the justice system 
is derailed.385 
Victim participation and successful prosecution are interdependent. 
The justice system relies on victims to actively cooperate throughout the 
process.386 Many, though, avoid the justice system entirely or elect to 
abandon it.387 Surveys indicate that domestic violence victims forgo 
participation in the alleged assailant’s prosecution in eighty-five to ninety 
percent of cases.388 Sexual assault survivors disavow the judicial process 
from the outset by vastly underreporting their assaults.389 When they do 
come forward, many choose later to opt out of prosecution.390 There are 
manifold reasons in both cases. Notably, the fear of cross-examination is a 
uniform factor for withdrawal by domestic and sexual violence victims.391 
To appreciate how impeachment practices additionally contribute to the 
victim’s decision to withdraw from prosecution requires a brief discussion 
of the paradigms unique to both types of survivors. 
 
 382. See Lininger, Bearing the Cross, supra note 310, at 1357 (observing that “victims’ 
willingness to report crimes varies inversely with their fear of embarrassment during cross-
examination”). 
 383. The rule broadly applies to the vast majority of crimes without correlation to untruthful 
acts, thus enabling defense counsel to question victim-witnesses about innocuous prior 
convictions under the auspices of challenging credibility. Moreover, as interpreted, trial courts 
lack discretion to curb the harmful effect on the witness—even when revealing her prior crimes 
would be unfairly prejudicial. See supra Section II.E. 
 384. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 39, § 609 app. 100, at 18 (“Fear of public degradation 
may make the possessors of a criminal record reluctant to testify, or even to complain of criminal 
acts directed against them, to the detriment of the judicial system’s interest in obtaining useful 
testimony.”). 
 385. Id. 
 386. De Sanctis, supra note 308, at 367; Lininger, Holding Batterers Accountable, supra note 
309, at 870–71 (describing the indispensability of domestic assault victims to prosecution). 
 387. Lininger, Holding Batterers Accountable, supra note 309, at 868–71 (observing that the 
vast majority of victims eventually recant, refuse to testify, or fail to appear at trial). 
 388. De Sanctis, supra note 308, at 367; Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers, supra note 308, at 
768. 
 389. Sexual assault remains the most underreported crime in the nation with sixty-three 
percent of sexual violence not being reported to police. Sexual Assault in the United States, supra 
note 342. 
 390. Fan, supra note 301, at 785–88 (noting studies demonstrating severe victim 
dissatisfaction with the judicial system and how the adversarial process discourages victims from 
participation). 
 391. Bruton, supra note 301, at 178; Lininger, Bearing the Cross, supra note 310, at 1357–58. 
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In domestic cases, violence is one part of a complex cycle 
characterized by three distinct phases.392 In the tension-building phase, the 
victim commonly experiences psychological abuse targeting her self-
esteem.393 This period eventually crescendos into the violence phase where 
she is physically assaulted.394 The third “honeymoon” phase is 
characterized by the assailant expressing remorse while seeking 
reconciliation.395 Most efforts to prosecute the assailant are frustrated by the 
effect of the honeymoon phase on the victim.396 Domestic violence victims 
who do not succumb to its effects, however, face other impediments to 
assisting prosecution. They must overcome reprisal threats from the 
assailants, public scrutiny, confrontation with their abusers, and targeted 
cross-examination tactics.397 
Sexual assault victims experience their own distinct psychological 
trauma that impacts their willingness to cooperate in prosecuting their 
perpetrators. The violation to the victim’s autonomy imposes a deep sense 
of personal vulnerability.398 She may experience feelings of weakness, loss 
of control, and fear.399 Most survivors are also plagued by deep distrust.400 
Their victimization leads not only to distrusting the assailant but also 
infects their faith in society as a whole.401 The severe psychological trauma 
inflicted on the sexual assault survivor represents a significant impediment 
to her participation in the judicial process. 
The psychological disincentives for victims of domestic and sexual 
assault to confront their assailants are valid. The judicial system itself 
should not exacerbate them. Yet, systemic impediments that cause victims 
to abandon the process abound. Domestic violence victims may encounter 
unsympathetic police grown weary from responding to the repeated 
cycle.402 They may have to work in tandem with prosecutors frustrated by 
 
 392. St. Joan, supra note 301, at 274. 
 393. De Sanctis, supra note 308, at 369 (explaining how victim cooperation directly 
correlates to the cycle of violence); Jennice Vilhauer, Understanding the Victim: A Guide to Aid 
in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 953, 954–55 (2000) 
(chronicling the cycles of domestic violence and their effect on prosecuting assailants). 
 394. De Sanctis, supra note 308 at 369; Vilhauer, supra note 393, at 954. 
 395. De Sanctis, supra note 308, at 369; Vilhauer, supra note 393, at 955. 
 396. De Sanctis, supra note 308, at 369–70; Rouhanian, supra note 303, at 33 (noting that the 
honeymoon phase is characterized by domestic violence survivors experiencing hope that 
reconciliation is real, believing their abusers will transform their lives). 
 397. See De Sanctis, supra note 308, at 368–74; St. Joan, supra note 301, at 298; Vilhauer, 
supra note 393, at 958–59. 
 398. Rouhanian, supra note 303, at 33. 
 399. Id. 
 400. Id. 
 401. Id. 
 402. See De Sanctis, supra note 308, at 371; Rouhanian, supra note 303, at 27. 
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the victim’s reluctance.403 In some cases, domestic violence victims 
experience judges who are intolerant of the victim who, in their view, has 
continued to put herself in harm’s way.404  
Meanwhile, sexual assault victims must endure the realities of the 
proof process. They often undergo invasive tests to collect forensic 
evidence.405 Investigators probe their stories in excruciating detail by 
delving into deeply personal aspects of their bodies, lives, and health.406 
And, of course, the adversarial system commands that victims directly 
confront their assailants.407 
Victim reluctance with assisting prosecution is unnecessarily 
heightened, however, when evidence rules open avenues for personal 
attacks in the courtroom.408 Today, the fear of cross-examination ranks 
among the key structural impediments to victim participation through final 
prosecution.409 Defendants know this.410 When a case cannot go forward 
without the victim’s testimony, defendants are incentivized to make cross-
examination particularly unpleasant in hopes the victim recants or 
withdraws.411 Thus, in some cases, the primary defense tactic involves 
employing a “brutal cross-examination” to destroy the victim.412 The 
victim’s behavior, sexual history, psychological well-being, and lifestyle 
are paraded publicly.413 Humiliating details about her body and personal 
life may be revealed in questioning.414 The victim’s imagined fears thus 
become reality. She may simply relent or recant rather than suffer an 
inevitable indignity. 
North Carolina Rule 609 imposes yet another impediment to victim 
participation. Its purported function is to reveal a witness’s mendacious 
character. The rule is not limited to crimes of dishonesty, however.415 It 
encompasses thousands of offenses.416 When the victim’s prior crimes 
 
 403. Lininger, Bearing the Cross, supra note 310, at 1362 (“Many prosecutors, fearing the 
victims’ potential recusal, come to regard accusers as saboteurs.”). 
 404. St. Joan, supra note 301, at 265, 282. 
 405. Held, supra note 363, at 448–49 (detailing the deplorable state of untested rape kits). 
 406. Id. at 447–52. 
 407. See Fan, supra note 301, at 787. 
 408. See id. at 785–89. 
 409. See Bruton, supra note 301, at 178; Lininger, Bearing the Cross, supra note 310, at 
1357–58. 
 410. See Lininger, Bearing the Cross, supra note 310, at 1366 (observing that defendants and 
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 411. Id. at 1361. 
 412. Id. at 1362; Luban, supra note 349, at 1028. 
 413. Lininger, Bearing the Cross, supra note 310, at 1361; Schotland, supra note 348, at 28. 
 414. Schotland, supra note 348, at 28. 
 415. See supra notes 219–23 and accompanying text. 
 416. See supra notes 242–47 and accompanying text. 
97 N.C. L. REV. 1553 (2019) 
1614 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97 
reveal risky, foolish, or immoral behavior, the rule functions in fact as one 
more source of public embarrassment.417 The state’s broad impeachment 
rule also facilitates senseless psychological trauma the victim would 
understandably want to avoid. For example, the domestic victim may 
perceive conviction-based impeachment as confirming the type of verbal 
abuse she has endured. Permitting attacks on her credibility with innocuous 
crimes mirrors the coercive tactics the defendant may have employed 
throughout their relationship. His threats that “nobody will believe you,” 
“they don’t know the real you,” and “if you say anything I will destroy 
you,” are confirmed by broad conviction-based impeachment. 
Naturally, any voluntary witness would reconsider a scenario that 
involved being publicly humiliated with the witness’s criminal record. Few 
would elect to withstand such an ordeal willingly. For a North Carolina 
victim, that calculus is psychologically intertwined with knowing the 
torment will come from her attacker. She is not merely castigated with her 
criminal record by an unknown person. The defendant himself or his 
lawyer will demand she account for her criminal foibles.418 That attacks on 
her character come from the defendant, either personally or by proxy, 
further disincentivizes the victim’s participation at trial.419 
A victim’s reluctance to cooperate with the prosecution is equally 
justified by North Carolina courts’ own reluctance to intervene. Her fear 
that cross-examination will turn into a humiliating exposé is hardly 
misplaced when the law makes her criminal record fair game for attack and 
denies trial judges the discretion to curb its use. A victim-witness who 
possesses even a modest criminal record has yet another valid reason to 
avoid a North Carolina criminal justice system that seems stacked against 
her when trial courts fail to intervene. Using our prior hypothetical to 
illustrate, consider the inevitable conversation between the prosecutor and 
victim in the weeks preceding trial: 
P: We also need to discuss your criminal record. 
V: Why? I’m not in trouble am I? 
P: No. No, you’re not. 
V: Then why do we need to talk about my record? 
P: Because it will probably come up at trial. 
V: What? Why would it come up then? 
 
 417. See generally Bruton, supra note 301, at 175 (“[S]ome questions do not advance a truth-
seeking function at all, but instead serve only to embarrass or abuse.”). 
 418. Lininger, Bearing the Cross, supra note 310, at 1360. 
 419. See Fan, supra note 301, at 789–90; Lininger, Bearing the Cross, supra note 310, at 
1366. 
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P: Because defense counsel can use it to challenge you. 
V: I don’t understand. 
P: North Carolina law allows witnesses to be challenged with their 
criminal convictions. 
V: They’re going to ask me about stuff from high school? 
P: They may. All of your convictions can be used to impeach you. 
V: Impeach me? 
P: Suggest that you are not telling the truth. 
V: They’re going to say I’m lying about being raped because of 
those stupid things? 
P: They are allowed to, yes. 
V: What does that have to do with what he did to me? 
P: Well, nothing, but the law says the jury can consider your 
convictions. 
V: Jurors are going to consider my convictions? 
P: They are permitted to, yes. 
V: Can’t the judge stop this? 
D: No. And that’s why we need to talk about how to address them. 
V: This is unbelievable . . . 
A federal prosecutor could offer markedly different advice to the same 
victim, reassuring her that, under the federal rules, her misdemeanor 
offenses would be off limits for impeaching her at trial. The federal 
prosecutor could assuage any lingering doubts by filing a pretrial motion to 
exclude her convictions under Federal Rule 609. The victim would have 
confidence going forward knowing the judge would prevent disparaging 
forays into her criminal past. She could trust the judicial system to protect 
her from this kind of public embarrassment. Likewise, the federal 
prosecutor could focus on addressing her other fears knowing her criminal 
record would not deter her from cooperating further. 
The cross-examination tactics that may be employed at trial rank 
among the critical factors victims contemplate when deciding whether to 
testify.420 North Carolina victims who possess a criminal record face an 
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additional factor weighing against participation. Knowing she may be 
impeached with her criminal past is one more reason to decline assisting 
prosecution. The effect of that decision is simply too great––particularly 
when weighed against the negligible value crimes unrelated to truthfulness 
have in assessing witness credibility. When survivors elect to forgo 
assisting prosecution, guilty persons avoid accountability for their crimes. 
They remain at large to reinjure the victim or others. North Carolina Rule 
609 thus compels an irreconcilable paradox: the judicial system that affords 
justice for the victim is the same system that systemically discourages her 
participation. 
IV.  PROPOSED REFORM TO NORTH CAROLINA RULE 609 
The negative repercussions to victim-witnesses alone compel 
reforming North Carolina’s current impeachment practices.421 While little 
scholarship has been devoted to the impact of conviction-based 
impeachment on victim-witnesses, the harmful effects associated with the 
practice generally are well documented.422 Scholars have proposed 
alternatives for years to rectify the abuses inherent in a rule that exposes 
jurors to damning evidence about the witness’s past and, correspondingly, 
tends to chill the participation of witnesses vital to the justice system.423 
This Article adds a victim-focused perspective to that chorus, proposing 
revisions to North Carolina Rule 609 to rid it of the harmful side effects 
associated with conviction-based impeachment previously revealed and 
now being exposed. 
Reforming conviction-based impeachment practices offers several 
alternatives. One approach would prohibit impeachment with prior-
conviction evidence entirely.424 Another involves mimicking the federal 
rule.425 Although both would represent significant reform to North Carolina 
practice, each is problematic. A new rule that is narrow in focus, relying 
less on subjective tests and jury instructions, is preferable. 
A. Credibility in Focus 
The sole purpose of impeaching a witness with her criminal record 
should be to challenge her credibility as a truth-telling witness.426 Starting 
 
 421. The deleterious impact on accused persons is undeniable as well. This issue, however, is 
the subject of the author’s future scholarship and beyond the scope of this Article. 
 422. See supra note 8. 
 423. See supra notes 8–10. 
 424. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 425. See supra notes 133–38 and accompanying text. 
 426. Rule 609’s focus is explicit: “For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,” 
evidence of the witness’s prior criminal convictions may be elicited. N.C. R. EVID. 609(a). 
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with this premise focuses the task. Crimes that primarily bear upon this 
singular question are the most viable and should be included; those that do 
not deserve exclusion. 
Certainly, one option for curing the ills associated with conviction-
based impeachment would be to ban the practice. Hawaii and Montana 
elected this approach after concluding the harms simply outweigh the 
benefits.427 Similarly, the Uniform Rules suggest an outright ban on using 
convictions to impeach accused persons.428 Categorical bans raise 
significant concerns, however. While laudable for focusing juror attention 
solely on the case questions, they deny jurors information directly related 
to the credibility of the witness. Respecting the defendant’s confrontation 
rights by leaving open a narrow cross-examination window is a key 
consideration.429 And a witness previously convicted of perjury should not 
be shielded from rules primarily designed to protect against unfair 
character assumptions.430 Simply put, excluding all prior convictions for 
impeaching witness credibility is overly exclusive. 
How to delineate between the crimes that directly correlate to witness 
untruthfulness against those that do not becomes the critical question. The 
long history of contemplating witness impeachment provides the answer. 
The consensus of rule drafters is that crimes involving dishonesty or false 
statements most directly impugn witness credibility.431 These crimen falsi 
offenses, including perjury, embezzlement, criminal fraud, and false 
statements, have long been recognized as bearing directly on an 
individual’s credibility as a truth-telling witness.432 The proof in 
establishing crimen falsi crimes offers assurance that the witness has 
engaged in acts directly correlated to falsity. These crimes fit the narrow 
focus of testing witness credibility and therefore warrant inclusion for juror 
consideration. 
Admitting crimes not involving dishonesty or false statements invites 
harmful side effects and is therefore inadvisable. Offenses that do not 
involve proving dishonesty as an element only impugn witness credibility 
 
Therefore, the convictions permitted under that rule must be considered solely in the context of 
their intended purpose—to evaluate witness credibility. Bellin, Circumventing Congress, supra 
note 8, at 310 n.80. 
 427. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 428. See supra notes 94–97 and accompanying text. 
 429. Jules Epstein, True Lies: The Constitutional and Evidentiary Bases for Admitting Prior 
False Accusation Evidence in Sexual Assault Prosecutions, 24 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 609, 632–33 
(2006). 
 430. See Simmons, supra note 7, at 997–98. 
 431. See FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2); UNIF. R. EVID. 21 (1953); MODEL CODE OF EVID. R. 106 
(AM. LAW. INST. 1942). 
 432. Ladd, supra note 77, at 179–80 (“The relationship of these crimes to veracity is self-
evident.”). 
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on the generalized presumption that, by committing an offense, the 
individual may be more willing to testify untruthfully.433 This hypothesis is 
equally as unconfirmed as juror misuse of such crimes is established.434 
Certainly Federal Rule 609 endorses broadly admitting generic convictions 
by permitting witness impeachment with any prior felony.435 The wisdom 
in doing so has been the subject of pointed, reasoned criticism for 
decades.436 
The harms associated with admitting crimes unrelated to dishonesty 
are myriad. All are rooted in the fact that these convictions generate 
negative side effects disproportionate to evaluating witness credibility. The 
probative value of crimes unrelated to dishonesty is simply low or 
nonexistent. A crime committed in the heat of passion says something 
about the actor in that precise moment but little about him far removed 
from it.437 A person who commits a crime because of addiction says a great 
deal about her dependency but nothing about her veracity.438 Crimes 
involving violence, drugs, and sexual misconduct are serious offenses to be 
sure. They do not, however, directly correlate to untruthfulness to the same 
extent as crimes involving false statements.439 
The prejudicial effect of admitting a broad range of crimes––whether 
felonies or misdemeanors––unrelated to dishonest acts is markedly 
disproportionate. The witness who recognizes the jury will see her criminal 
record as bearing on her personal behavior is incentivized to forgo 
testifying.440 The accused person who realizes he will be viewed as a mere 
criminal recidivist will elect silence.441 The juror exposed to conviction 
evidence is invited to conform to misplaced stereotypes.442 Senseless 
revictimization trauma is imposed on the victim.443 Embarrassment and 
humiliation to the survivor are obvious byproducts.444 These effects and 
more plague broad conviction usage.445 Narrowing the rule to crimes that 
directly correlate with witness veracity resolves these issues. 
 
 433. Id. at 176. 
 434. Id. at 186; see also Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475–76 (1948); Gold, 
supra note 99, at 2313. 
 435. See supra Section I.D. 
 436. See sources cited supra note 8. 
 437. See Ladd, supra note 77, at 178–79 
 438. Bellin, Circumventing Congress, supra note 8, at 302–03. 
 439. Surratt, supra note 82, at 931. 
 440. See supra Section III.C. 
 441. Bellin, Silence Penalty, supra note 8, at 415–24. 
 442. See supra Section III.A. 
 443. See supra Section III.B. 
 444. See supra Section III.C. 
 445. See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text. 
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B. Rejecting Broad Crimes Subject to Balancing Tests 
Some impeachment rules, including the federal rules, incorporate 
judicial balancing tests in an effort to ameliorate the dangers associated 
with broad inclusion of crimes unrelated to dishonesty.446 One option for 
revising North Carolina Rule 609 would be to mimic this approach. 
However, several decades of application and analysis of the federal rule 
reveal this option to be too fraught with error and inconsistency. 
Broadly incorporating convictions subject to judicial oversight to 
weigh the probative value against its prejudicial effect promotes 
inconsistency. Trial judges come from all walks of life. Their backgrounds 
and experiences, like all persons, influence their worldview. As a result, 
judicial decisions admitting or excluding convictions for impeachment 
purposes can vary widely.447 Some judges admit convictions in a seemingly 
indiscriminate manner whereas others are more exacting.448 A prosecutor 
moving to exclude a victim’s conviction for drug possession may be 
successful in some courts but not in others. Different trial judges applying 
subjective balancing tests to a broad range of convictions naturally means 
inconsistent results. In the years since the adoption of Federal Rule 609, 
appellate courts have languished over tests intended to assist trial judges in 
making discretionary decisions.449 More often than not, the tests themselves 
become a source of confusion or judicial justification.450 
Crafting a rule that incorporates an array of crimes subject to trial 
court discretion enables judicial stereotyping and bias to creep in, whether 
intentional or not.451 The judge grown weary from domestic abuse may 
admit a victim-witness’s prior crimes out of unrealized apathy or 
frustration.452 The jurist unwittingly influenced by cultural myths about 
sexual assault may be more inclined to permit impeachment with crimes 
involving risk-taking or immoral behavior.453 This is not to disparage the 
state’s able judges; it is simply an acknowledgement of documented human 
behavior. Cultural myths are difficult to displace even over many 
generations. 
Finally, leaving a door open to revealing a witness’s prior conviction 
too often encourages juror misuse and lawyer abuse. When crimes are 
unrelated to dishonesty, jurors are far more inclined to consider them as 
 
 446. See supra notes 133, 138 and accompanying text. 
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supporting preconceived myths, stereotypes, and a witness’s propensity for 
wrongdoing instead of the witness’s credibility.454 Jury instructions to the 
contrary are widely regarded as ineffective and, in fact, tend to make things 
worse by highlighting the impropriety.455 Likewise, trial lawyers beholden 
to the constructs of the adversarial system will naturally take the 
opportunity to reveal crimes for any purpose that may benefit their client’s 
cause. That the byproduct of doing so may revictimize the witness or 
perpetuate harmful stereotypes indicts the rule that condones the 
impeachment far more than the lawyer who employs it. 
A rule that broadly admits crimes subject to individual judicial 
balancing would, among other documented ills, needlessly invite 
inconsistent rulings, disparate treatment of witnesses, judicial stereotyping, 
juror misuse, and trial lawyer abuse. 
C. A Reformed Rule 609 
Rather than clinging to outmoded, faulty assumptions that any crime 
begets untruthful testimony, a reasoned approach that embraces modern 
understandings of witness testimony and jury bias should be employed. A 
simple change would protect victim-witnesses and enhance the foundations 
of the state’s justice system. 
North Carolina Rule 609(a) now reads: 
(a) General rule.—For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a 
witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a felony, or 
of a Class A1, Class 1, or Class 2 misdemeanor, shall be admitted if 
elicited from the witness or established by public record during 
cross-examination or thereafter.456 
Rule 609(a) should be amended to read as follows: 
(a) General rule.—For the purpose of questioning the credibility of a 
witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime may 
be admitted, subject to Rule 403, where the court can readily 
determine that establishing the elements of the crime required 
proving—or the witness admitting—a dishonest act or false 
statement, such as perjury, subordination of perjury, false statement, 
embezzlement, or criminal fraud. 
The revised rule narrows the range of crimes available to impeach all 
witnesses. It also offers a narrow window for judicial discretion to exclude 
convictions in the limited cases where their admission would do more harm 
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than good.457 To be sure, not all crimes of dishonesty are so probative of 
witness untruthfulness to warrant mandatory inclusion. For example, the 
victim who pled guilty to passing a worthless check because she needed 
food after escaping her abuser has committed a crime out of desperation 
and not mendacious character. 
The proposed revision promotes an important policy goal of 
protecting victim-witnesses from the abuses currently fostered by the 
state’s broad approach. It also has the concomitant effect of encouraging all 
persons with knowledge to more freely testify without fear of jurors 
misusing prior-conviction evidence to demonize them. And it would inhibit 
trial lawyers from injecting character assaults under the auspices of 
credibility checks. Notably, the amendment is neither a whimsical nor 
radical concept. It is, in fact, entirely consistent with the original proposal 
for Rule 609 suggested by the North Carolina Evidence Laws Study 
Committee some thirty-five years ago.458 Their first proposal was the right 
one. 
CONCLUSION 
North Carolina impeachment practices continue to be guided by the 
dead hand of the common law. While the federal system modified 
conviction-based impeachment decades ago, North Carolina stood its 
ground. As states have refined impeachment rules over the years, North 
Carolina has remained mired in the past. Now, as the impact of conviction-
based impeachment is being fully understood, North Carolina’s regressive 
approach cannot afford to become fossilized. 
As enacted and interpreted, North Carolina Rule of Evidence 609 
enables character assassinations under the pretense of questioning 
credibility. The state’s adherence to ancient dogma has a devastating effect 
on victim-witnesses and the judicial system as a whole. Survivors are 
subject to being castigated with their prior criminal misdeeds. 
Impeachment focused on character attacks cuts to the heart of the 
individual, causing senseless revictimization trauma to persons already 
abused. At the same time, jurors are invited to degrade survivors by 
 
 457. United States v. McRae, 593 F.2d 700, 707 (5th Cir. 1979) (“[The] major function [of 
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applying cultural myths about violent acts and negative stereotypes 
concerning victim behavior. Victims contemplating testifying may simply 
retreat, to the detriment of societal interests. 
This Article is not intended to undermine the crucial and historical 
importance of a pointed cross-examination but to infuse reliability and 
decency into the process. Trial outcomes tainted by systemic infirmities are 
most inexcusable when easily avoidable. Acquittals or convictions curated 
by injecting misplaced conviction evidence into trials circumvent the proof 
process and undermine confidence in the justice system. Sound policy 
demands trial results be sustained on reliable, relevant evidence rather than 
unfounded myths and stereotypes. 
Revising North Carolina Rule 609 is an opportunity to take 
measurable steps toward eliminating harmful structural components within 
the state’s justice system. A rule that narrows the focus of impeachment 
benefits all witnesses—victims and the accused alike. Senseless ventures 
into a witness’s past offenses that have no bearing on untruthful conduct, 
and even less on predicting false testimony, function primarily to misdirect 
the trial process. The sole purpose of impeaching a witness with her prior-
conviction history is to enable the jury to evaluate her credibility as a 
truthful witness. Nothing more; nothing less. From this precept we can 
reevaluate the crimes that bear primarily on this issue and this issue alone. 
Crimes that involve proving dishonesty or false statement do just that. All 
others invite harms on the participants and the process. 
